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Aristotle Versus the Aristotelians

How do citizens maintain a system of government based on the idea of natural rights when the very idea of nature is under assault? 

Our equal rights, according to the Declaration of Independence, are grounded in “the laws of Nature and Nature’s God.” Yet according to many leading intellectuals, nature or reality has no independent existence outside of human will. This postmodern notion—that an intelligible world and universally valid science are mere social constructs—has been orthodox opinion in many university departments for decades. In recent years, however, the repudiation of nature, including human nature, has burst into everyday experience, most strikingly in the controversy over transgender athletes dominating women’s sports. According to many leftist ideologues, even the most basic facts of biology must submit to the dictates of politics. As Planned Parenthood memorably declared in a March 2018 tweet, “Some men have a uterus.”

Because the American regime is founded on a philosophical idea, these developments threaten the health of our civic culture. What started out as academic theorizing and ideological posturing now undermines Americans’ conception of our government and the ground of its legitimacy. Strange as it may seem, to be an American citizen requires sound metaphysics. 

Though this is not its professed intent, Edward Feser’s Aristotle’s Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and Biological Science can be seen as a welcome attempt to recover and strengthen the philosophical underpinnings of American constitutionalism. It offers detailed rebuttals to various scientific and philosophical arguments that challenge what we might call “metaphysical realism.” Despite many sophisticated or sophistic arguments to the contrary, says Feser, modern science cannot escape the logic and axioms articulated by Aristotle. He writes that  “the very possibility of science presupposes the reality and reducibility of the conscious, thinking embodied subject,” and “we cannot in turn make sense of this subject without deploying the fundamental concepts of Aristotelian philosophy of nature such as actuality and potentiality, form and matter, and efficient and final causality.” 

A Series of Disputatios

Feser teaches philosophy at Pasadena City College and his writings focus especially on the Catholic scholastic tradition of Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle’s Revenge is a sequel to his Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (2014). Whereas the previous book was directed to a more general audience, this one has a more academic bent, consisting of a lengthy, almost overwhelming, series of disputed questions (disputatios) on a dizzying variety of topics including: philosophy of mind, quantum mechanics, evolution, neurobiology, epistemology, mechanical determinism, and the “hard problem of consciousness.”  

The highly ambitious scope of Feser’s project is impressive, but it leads him to a somewhat hubristic misjudgement about just how much he can really prove. It seems not only unnecessary but counterproductive to assert, as Feser does, that modern science’s strict materialism and rejection of metaphysics “settles nothing,” or that “both the practice and the results of natural science” are “in no way incompatible” with Aristotle. The almost miraculous achievements of modern technology indicate that science succeeds on its own terms quite stupendously, at least on the practical level. Because the author tries to prove too much, he persuades less than he might. Some readers might in fact come away misapprehending the real problems with modern science, and thus become more alienated from nature and classical metaphysics as a ground of moral and political legitimacy than they were. 

In Feser’s rush to correct all of modern science’s errors and misconceptions, entire books in the secondary literature are dispensed with in a paragraph or even a sentence. Some, to be sure, deserve such treatment. Yet the overall effect is like paging through a diner menu: the dozens of disparate choices—from shrimp scampi to meatloaf—lead one to doubt that so many dishes could be fresh and well-prepared. 

Longer treatments have problems as well. Feser devotes a full dozen pages (a large amount of space for this book) to examining Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini’s What Darwin Got Wrong (2010) in the belief that it supports his thesis by giving “aid and comfort to Aristotelian essentialism.” Feser does a good job of explaining the authors’ complex arguments about the difficulty of knowing how evolutionary adaptations come about. What he doesn’t do is mention that neither is an evolutionary biologist (Fodor is a philosopher and Piatelli-Palmarini a cognitive scientist) and he passes over too hastily the heavy criticism the book received from evolutionary biologists when it was published. These points don’t mean the book is wrong, but surely they would be relevant for the reader to know. 

In general, topics as well as sources seem to be treated cursorily. Even such a massive subject as the objective existence of time is disposed of in a few pages, hardly enough to understand Aristotle’s own fascinating comments on the subject. Feser doesn’t quote or even mention Aristotle’s provocative observation in the Physics (remarkably, the only work by Aristotle included in the 40-page bibliography): “There is a perplexity about whether time could exist without human soul, for it is not clear how the counting of the passing of time could take place without a soul to count.” The author’s consistent disregard for Aristotle’s own words points to one of the book’s most curious and disappointing features. 

The Ubiquitous “Aristotel-ian”

The truly hard-working character in Aristotle’s Revenge is a fellow named Ian, who haunts the book like a shadow, liberated from any concrete existence or accountability. Aristotel-ian is a strongly favored term here, but one also encounters Darwin-ian and Newton-ian. Whenever (which is to say often) Feser wishes to advance an argument without any specific citation, its provenance is laid at Ian’s ephemeral feet: “An Aristotelian would argue”; “According to Aristotelian thought”; and many other examples. This reader grew weary of Ian by the end.  

This problem arises from Feser’s evident belief that Aristotle is all-but-interchangeable with his Catholic interpreters. But as Armand Leroi notes in his wonderfully engaging The Lagoon: How Aristotle Invented Science (2014), the scholastics’ “method was disputatious, their factions innumerable, their writings interminable and their conclusions stultifying. Much of it wasn’t very Aristotelian at all.” 

To some this may seem like quibbling: Who cares whether an idea can be traced to Aristotle or Aquinas, as long as it’s true? But on one key point, with significant implications, what Feser says isn’t true: He repeatedly misunderstands or misrepresents Aristotle’s explanation of final cause, or “teleology.” This is the notion that in addition to material cause (the bricks and mortar of a house), the formal cause (the architect’s blueprints), and the efficient or moving cause (the workers building the house), we may often find a final cause as well: namely, that for the sake of which the house is being built. (In this example, the final cause or telos is to provide suitable shelter.) Aristotle clearly says that living organisms have ends or final causes, and manmade artifacts such as a house also have them, in a sort of imitation of nature.

He repeatedly but erroneously claims that for Aristotle, everything with a regular or predictable effect, including inanimate substances, also has a final cause directing it to that outcome. Phosphorus exists for the sake of burning, says he, and ice has a final cause of cooling things around it. Possibly this is Aquinas’s view (I can’t say), but it isn’t Aristotle’s.  

It might seem like an abstruse point, but let me explain why this is wrong in a way that really matters. 

Obscuring the Early Modern Derailment

The soulless materialism of modern science, which Feser so powerfully challenges, had its origins in an explicitly anti-Aristotelian scientific and political project, launched by early modern philosophers such as Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, and Thomas Hobbes. These figures rejected the idea that nature contained any teleological ends or “for the sake of” causes. The world, they insisted, is just “matter in motion.” Politics in their view needed to dispense with the idea of nature’s pointing to anything normative any idea of “natural right.” And politics needed to join with science in conquering the natural world to bestow material benefits on mankind. Nature would cease being a guide to our proper ends in order to become mere workable material, to be shaped to our needs and wants.  

In the Declaration of Independence, the American Founders rejected this key aspect of modern science when they committed our new nation to final causes, “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” (This is almost straight out of Aristotle, who says in the Politics that people form a political community for the sake of securing life, but the real goalthe final cause is living well, happiness.) 

This idea of nature’s containing the ends for human life is difficult for many people today to accept or comprehend. To defend it requires rhetorical care and prudence. Unfortunately, Feser undermines this effort. It is easy for people to see (once it is explained) that the acorn has its own internal end; it exists “for the sake of” becoming an oak tree. Likewise, dogs have a proper end inherent in their nature, which involves a richer form of life than a tree. And humans, at the top of the complexity chain, exist “for the sake of” fulfilling their more elaborate potential, which is  encapsulated in the idea of happiness. 

All of this becomes very strange and unpalatable to modern ears, however, when Feser insists (as he does over and over in the book) that the properties of inanimate objects are final ends. But this is not correct. Phosphorus happens to be flammable; and ice cools its surroundings simply because frozen water is cold. That’s it. These effects are not why these objects exist; they don’t have a why. (When phosphorus burns human flesh, or ice causes frostbite, would Feser argue that these objects are fulfilling their final cause? Did nature create ice “for the sake of” damaging our skin?) Feser’s anti-Aristotelian arguments on this important point undermine his otherwise laudable project. 

Admittedly, he is not trying to defend the political implications of teleology; his book is not about the doctrine of natural right articulated by the American Founders. But he is trying to defend the very same philosophy of nature or metaphysical realism upon which the Founders relied. By misdirecting the reader on one of its most important concepts, he makes the book less valuable politically and undercuts his own professed aims.

Almost at the end of this work there appears a term that is used repeatedly in Feser’s earlier work: “Scholastic teleological realism.” This appears to be his own unique blend of metaphysical naturalism. It might have been simpler, less contrived, and more interesting if he had just distilled and served up his personal recipe for a proper philosophy of nature, rather than relying throughout the book on watered down helpings of “Ian’s Aristotle.” 

I commend Professor Feser on his impressive knowledge and wide reading. Aristotle’s Revenge represents a stupendous effort and corrects many philosophical errors. It is a pity that also it includes one major one, which makes the book deeply flawed.

Reader Discussion

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on August 28, 2019 at 09:03:55 am

Yes, the Thomists misread Aristotle as a Thomist, as did St, Thomas himself, owing perhaps to the fact that he reportedly first read Aristotle's Metaphysics in a Latin translation of an Arabic translation of the original Greek. The result was a mistaken attribution to Aristotle of the Stoic doctrine of natural law, which Aquinas accepted, . We are still suffering from the confusion. Occam and other critics of Aquinas pointed out the error, but the authority of Aristotle was too useful to resist. It ceased to be an asset only with Galileo's critique of Aristotle's Physics.

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Max Hocutt
on August 28, 2019 at 10:12:21 am

I am looking at Feser’s book, and there is much that is worthwhile. I recommend it highly. Yet, he does try to do too much too quickly. Re natural teleology and its role for both ethics, natural law, and natural rights, see Veatch’s RATIONAL MAN, and FOR AN ONTOLOGY OF MORALS; Foot’s NATURAL GOODNESS; Miller’s NATURE, JUSTICE, AND RIGHTS IN ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS; and Rasmussen and Den Uyl, NORMS OF LIBERTY and THE PERFECTIONIST TURN.

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Douglas Rasmussen
on August 28, 2019 at 12:08:02 pm

Prof. Feser happens to be quite correct when he insists that, from a classical Aristotelian perspective, teleology is global/universal--no thing is excluded, whereas moderns deny that teleology is universal. Proponents of scientism prefer "teleonomy" (the appearance of teleology) over real, metaphysical teleology. Readers should make no mistake about that.

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P.A. Pagan, Ph.D.
on August 28, 2019 at 12:55:29 pm

The truly hard-working character in Aristotle’s Revenge is a fellow named Ian, who haunts the book like a shadow, liberated from any concrete existence or accountability. Aristotel-ian is a strongly favored term here, but one also encounters Darwin-ian and Newton-ian. Whenever (which is to say often) Feser wishes to advance an argument without any specific citation, its provenance is laid at Ian’s ephemeral feet: “An Aristotelian would argue”; “According to Aristotelian thought”; and many other examples. This reader grew weary of Ian by the end.

Cleverly said!

[A]ccording to many leading intellectuals, nature or reality has no independent existence outside of human will. This postmodern notion—that an intelligible world and universally valid science are mere social constructs—has been orthodox opinion in many university departments for decades. In recent years, however, the repudiation of nature, including human nature, has burst into everyday experience, most strikingly in the controversy over transgender athletes dominating women’s sports. According to many leftist ideologues, even the most basic facts of biology must submit to the dictates of politics.

…Less cleverly said. If we would give Ian a rest by including citations, perhaps we might also include a few citations to the “many leading intellectuals” who have argued that nature or reality has no independent existence outside of human will. Descartes? Nietzsche? Thomas Kuhn? People who embrace the Simulation Hypothesis?

As Planned Parenthood memorably declared in a March 2018 tweet, “Some men have a uterus.”

Yup. American band leader Billy Tipton acted as a man and lived in the public eye as a famous jazz musician from the 1930s to the 1970s—yet had a uterus. You may disagree with Planned Parenthood’s statement as a matter of semantics, or even of politics. But you would have difficulty contesting the fact that many people with uteruses have presented themselves in the social role of men throughout history. I agree that some people seem to want to live in denial of the evidence—but I suspect we would disagree when it came to identifying those people.

Feser doesn’t quote or even mention Aristotle’s provocative observation in the Physics …: “There is a perplexity about whether time could exist without human soul, for it is not clear how the counting of the passing of time could take place without a soul to count.”

Yeah, and that’s nice. But Aristotle lived from 384–322 BCE, long after Protagoras of Abdera (c. 490 - c.420 BCE) had declared, “Man is the measure of all things.”

In the Declaration of Independence, the American Founders rejected this key aspect of modern science when they committed our new nation to final causes, “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” (This is almost straight out of Aristotle, who says in the Politics that people form a political community for the sake of securing life, but the real goal—the final cause —is living well, happiness.)

Huh? What makes the Declaration of Independence a statement about science—or, indeed, about causes? The Declaration of Independence talks about Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness as rights, while Aristotle seems to talk about securing life, living well, and achieving happiness as objectives pursued by sentient creatures.

It is easy for people to see (once it is explained) that the acorn has its own internal end; it exists “for the sake of” becoming an oak tree.

It’s not easy for me to see.

Imagine we rig up an automated system that scans for plant growth in a given location, and if it detects anything higher than 1 inch, it turns on a flamethrower that destroys everything at that location. A creature acting “for the sake of” becoming a tree should stop growing at 1 inch, and wait for that automated mechanism to rust. In contrast, a creature following its genetics will simply follow its genetics, regardless of how well those genetics are adapted to a new environment, and get incinerated. Which path do you think the acorn would follow?

[I]n addition to material cause (the bricks and mortar of a house), the formal cause (the architect’s blueprints), and the efficient or moving cause (the workers building the house), we may often find a final cause as well: namely, that for the sake of which the house is being built. (In this example, the final cause or telos is to provide suitable shelter.) Aristotle clearly says that living organisms have ends or final causes, and manmade artifacts such as a house also have them, in a sort of imitation of nature.

Imagine two identical houses. Builders built one to sell for shelter--and the other as a model home to attract potential buyers, but on a lot that is not zoned residential, and thus the builders expect to tear it down once all the lots are sold. Do the two homes have different “causes”? And would anyone be able to discern the difference between the houses without reference to the builder’s intentions?

Imagine the zoning changes, and a family buys the model home to live in. Has the home’s “cause” changed retroactively?

Imagine after the family moves in, the house catches fire. The builder built the windows to let in light and air, but not as an egress. As the family scrambles for a way to flee the burning building, should they give a damn what the builder’s intentions were?

[H]umans, at the top of the complexity chain, exist “for the sake of” fulfilling their more elaborate potential, which is encapsulated in the idea of happiness.

And if certain humans derive happiness by presenting themselves as transgendered, then should I conclude that they exist “for the sake of” presenting themselves as transgendered?

Phosphorus happens to be flammable; and ice cools its surroundings simply because frozen water is cold. That’s it. These effects are not why these objects exist; they don’t have a why. (When phosphorus burns human flesh, or ice causes frostbite, would Feser argue that these objects are fulfilling their final cause? Did nature create ice “for the sake of” damaging our skin?)

“Why” do humans eat beef? And when a wolf eats a human, does the wolf have a different “why”? When a bacteria spreads, does it have a different “why?”

What test could we devise to determine the reason for a thing? I can’t think of one. At most, we can determine what happens when we remove/discontinue a thing. But to establish a purpose—as far as I can tell, that requires sentience to impute the purpose. And different sentiences might impute different purposes. To get back to Protagoras, “Man [remains] the measure of all things.”

I have never understood how teleology helps this discussion. Quite the opposite.

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nobody.really
on August 28, 2019 at 13:44:33 pm

Thanks for the comment.
What is the final cause (telos) of iron?
To be an axe, a manacle for a slave, a plow? To contribute to human health by being present in small amounts in the bloodstream? To be a metaphor in a speech by Bismarck? All of these at once?
Can one things have such an indeterminate, almost infinite, number of natural ends and final causes? How could that possibly be true?

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Glenn Ellmers
on August 28, 2019 at 13:56:28 pm

Btw, everyone forgets that final cause is, well... a cause. It has to contribute to bringing something about. In the generation of natural things this is clear. Oak trees perpetuate themselves by reaching maturity and generating others like themselves. In this, Aristotle and Darwin agree.
But how does flammability “cause” phosphorus?

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Glenn Ellmers
on August 28, 2019 at 15:11:42 pm

Glenn,

I find your view convincing insofar as it is a critique of some of Feser's arguments. However, I take issue with your characterization of Hobbes, who is probably closer to the American founders than you would like.

You write, "The soulless materialism of modern science, which Feser so powerfully challenges, had its origins in an explicitly anti-Aristotelian project, launched by early modern philosophers such as Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes.... Politics in their view needed to dispense with the idea of nature’s pointing to anything normative -- any idea of “natural right.”"

TW: Hobbes insists on a normative standard for political life, one that objectively leads to greater felicity for most men. Chapter 13 of Lev. shows that the natural state really is bad for human life, at least in most cases, and certainly in Hobbes's own case.

You write, "And politics needed to join with science in conquering the natural world to bestow material benefits on mankind. "

TW: I challenge you to find a quotation from Hobbes that supports this claim. There are few or none. He does praise the advantages of civilization, but in terms that one can agree with without buying into the conquest of nature. For Hobbes (and Locke too, but that's another story), it's not about conquering nature but rather cultivating it, improving on it, accepting the inexpungable naturalness of the human inclinations toward preservation, honor, glory, and happiness, but guiding them by reason (laws of nature) toward education and civilization.

You write, "Nature would cease being a guide to our proper ends in order to become mere workable material, to be shaped to our needs and wants."

TW: Yes, "our needs and wants" are the basis of building civilization. But what are our true needs? It is the task of the moral philosophers -- Rousseau calls them the "great preceptors of mankind" -- to analyze those needs and teach men their duties. Example: Hobbes says that men in a natural state often respond to insults with violence. But when this impulse is unrestrained, life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. In this case their true need is peace, not war. Thus the natural law mandates "seek peace." The duties taught by Hobbes will promote human well being. Among the prerequisites of that well being are such goods as life, liberty, pursuit of happiness.

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Thomas G. West
on August 28, 2019 at 15:16:18 pm

Re the case for a non-reductive biological basis for natural teleology, see: Richard Cameron, “How To Be a Realist About Sui Generis Teleology Yet Feel At Home In The 21st Century,” The Monist 87.1 (2004): 72-95; André Ariew, “Platonic and Aristotelian Roots of Teleological Arguments,” Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 7-32; James G. Lennox, “Teleology,” in Evelyn Fox Keller’s and Elisabeth A. Lloyd’s, eds. Keywords in Evolutionary Biology (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 324-333; Allan Gotthelf, “Aristotle’s Conception of Final Causality,” in Allan Gotthelf’s and James Lennox’s, eds. Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 204-242; and Fred D. Miller, Jr., Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), section 10.2, “Natural Teleology,” pp. 336-346. There is even more work done on this topic that should not be ignored.

Before one writes off natural teleology as irrelevant, see these works and the works cited in a previous comment.

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Douglas Rasmussen
on August 28, 2019 at 15:41:05 pm

“It is, then, the teleological character of human flourishing that gets the perfectionist ethical enterprise off the ground, so to speak. It is by consideration of a human being’s natural end or function that a description of a human being can also be an evaluation, and that a basis for determining what is choice-worthy and ought to be done can be provided. Yet, it is just on this point of natural teleology that many contemporary philosophers hesitate. Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer express this hesitation in an archetypal fashion.

Aristotle’s view makes sense within the framework of a teleological vision of the universe, but without that framework the idea that human beings have a function collapses, and with it Aristotle’s foundation for the view
that we ought to perfect traits that are essential to us. Without the idea that we were put on Earth for some purpose, attempts to retain the view that it is good for us to perfect our human nature run the risk of skating
over the gap between “is” and “ought.”

Though we will have much to say in Part II about what natural teleology involves, as well as the alleged gap between “is” and “ought,” a brief response to this account of teleology needs to be made. Simply
put, this account fails to distinguish between what might be called a “Platonic” model and an “Aristotelian” model of teleology. The former requires the actions of a rational agent or mind whose intentions apply to the entire cosmos, and whose intentions are those in terms of which processes in the natural world are judged good or bad. For this model, the telos of an entity is “external” to it and is in principle no different from that of an artifact—for example, a chair’s proper function and standard for goodness is the purpose for which it was created. In contrast, an “Aristotelian” model does not require a rational agent or mind whose intentions apply to the entire cosmos. Rather, teleology is based on the character of living things and is “immanent” or “internal” to the organism. The telos of a living thing results from an internal directive principle that is an irreducible feature of the developmental process of the living organism itself. Additionally, the process does not require an immaterial, separable force, an élan vital, within an organism. Rather, the process is irreducible: the movement from potentiality to actuality is intrinsic to the constitution of the organism in such a way that other kinds of accounts (for example, mechanical or chemical) are insufficient explanations of this movement.”

Den Uyl and Rasmussen, THE PERFECTIONIST TURN, pp. 45-46.

We have much more to say on this topic, and its relevance for ethics.

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Douglas Rasmussen
on August 28, 2019 at 16:03:54 pm

I think claims like "some men have a uterus" look much less uncongenial once one views them through the lens of Hayek's essay "The Facts of the Social Sciences," where he argues that the facts with which social science deals (language, money, tools, weapons) are generally defined in terms of human attitudes toward them. If we treat sex as a natural-science matter and gender as a social-science matter, then the claim is not one that either Hayekians or Aristoteleans need to take issue with.

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Roderick T. Long
on August 28, 2019 at 16:11:23 pm

Chapter 13 of Lev. shows that the natural state really is bad for human life, at least in most cases, and certainly in Hobbes’s own case.

Hobbes described the life of man outside of society as "nasty, brutish, and short." Then again, other people described Hobbes as nasty, brutish, and short.

(Just kidding. Hobbes was allegedly six ft tall.)

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nobody.really
on August 28, 2019 at 18:03:29 pm

Thanks Tom. I always appreciate your insights and feedback. I just haven't had time to digest your new views on Hobbes, so I'm still operating on Straussian Standard Time. I will be at the Hobbes panel at APSA (right after mine), and will be following the arguments with keen interest.

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Glenn Ellmers
on August 28, 2019 at 19:31:29 pm

Here one might draw the reader's attention to an important distinction that is often overlooked or ignored, and I'll point out the distinction using an example. Suppose that you see an animal in the distance and you point it out to me, and suppose that I ask you "What kind of animal is it?" Suppose further that, under the given circumstances, you're unable to specify precisely what kind of animal it is. Would I be justified in saying in response that you have no good reason to claim that there is an animal there because you're unable to identify the species of animal? I think not. It's important not to confuse two types of question. One type of question (Q1) concerns the issue of existence, and another type of question (Q2) concerns the issue of essence. If one can answer Q2 (e.g., it's a cat), in many if not all cases one has answered Q1 (it's real). If one is unable to answer Q2 (I don't know what it is), it doesn't necessarily follow that the answer to Q1 is negative (it isn't real, but merely an illusion). Knowing that something is (existence) doesn't necessarily entail knowing what it is (essence or quiddity), and not knowing what a thing is (nescience or ignorance of essence) does not necessarily entail that it doesn't exist (non-being). The question of knowledge/ignorance is an epistemological issue, while the question of being/non-being is a metaphysical issue. If one cannot specify what the proper end (telos) of a thing is, it doesn't necessarily follow that the thing is without an end (telos). Furthermore, knowing that all things must have an end (telos) does not necessarily entail knowing the proper end of each and every thing. Of course, if one knew the proper end of each and every thing, one would know that each and every thing is ordered to an end. As far as I know, Prof. Feser doesn't claim to know the proper end of each and every thing, but it certainly doesn't follow that he cannot or does not know that each and every thing must have a proper end. One might add that talk about ends (teleology) will require talk about minds or a Mind which, as cause of each thing's nature or essence, orders each thing to its proper end. Such a discussion exceeds the methodological boundaries of empirical science, which is why professional scientists qua practitioners of empirical science do not advance such (philosophical) discussions without transcending the methodological boundaries of empirical science. Those who are interested in such meta-scientific discussions may profitably turn to experts like Mariano Artigas (e.g., _The Mind of the Universe: Understanding Science and Religion_ https://www.amazon.com/Mind-Universe-Understanding-Science-Religion/dp/1890151548 ) or Stanley Jaki (e.g., _The Road of Science and the Ways to God_ https://www.amazon.com/Road-Science-Ways-God/dp/0226391442 ), to name only two gifted authors. Now, if one wishes to dispute the properly philosophical claim that teleology is universal, one is free to do so, and there are solid philosophical arguments in defense of the classical conclusion that teleology is universal. If, however, one wishes to dispute whether Aristotle may rightly be counted among the proponents of universal teleology, that's a different matter. An in-depth discussion of Aristotle's position on the philosophical question of teleology would require some familiarity with the Aristotelian corpus, but one may locate at least a significant hint of Aristotle's actual position on teleology by reading the beginning of one of his important works, _Nicomachean Ethics_ https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/aristotle-the-nicomachean-ethics .

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P.A. Pagan, Ph.D.
on August 28, 2019 at 19:45:39 pm

One might add that among the classical four causes--material, formal, efficient, and final--the most important one is certainly the final cause, but this is something known quite well among Aristotelian and Thomistic thinkers. The other three causes necessarily depend on the final cause. In the order of material substances, the material and formal causes are brought together by the efficient cause, and the efficient cause would not act in any determinate way without reference to the final cause. The final cause is strictly indispensable from a philosophical point of view.

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P.A. Pagan, Ph.D.
on August 28, 2019 at 22:37:36 pm

Is this intended as a parody of scholastic verbosity run amok?

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Glenn Ellmers
on August 28, 2019 at 23:13:33 pm

Suppose that you see an animal in the distance and you point it out to me, and suppose that I ask you “What kind of animal is it?” Suppose further that, under the given circumstances, you’re unable to specify precisely what kind of animal it is. Would I be justified in saying in response that you have no good reason to claim that there is an animal there because you’re unable to identify the species of animal?

Ship's Purser: Doctor, have you seen Mr. Flowers?

Moon-Faced Martin: As a matter of fact, I just saw him going into the mizzen mast [the last of three masts].

Ship's Purser: We don’t have a mizzen mast.

Moon-Faced Martin: Then it must have been someone else.

Cole Porter’s Anything Goes (1934)

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nobody.really
on August 29, 2019 at 00:05:43 am

I haven’t read the Feser book but I trust Ellmers’ reading as accurate. Feser, on that reading, attempts to give a coherent, consistent, meaningful account of the universe through Aristotle’s version of nature and its four causes, above all, its ends or final causes. Every natural being, from the celestial to the organic and the inorganic, has a natural final cause, ordered to the final cause of causes, or prime mover. Unsurprisingly this way of understanding Aristotle’s metaphysics supplies natural support for religious doctrines, Catholic and non-Catholic, concerning creation and the divine creator. Ellmers emphasizes that Feser’s writings fall within Thomas Aquinas’ scholastic tradition and that Feser’s Aristotle is basically standard Catholic metaphysics.

Ellmers’ Aristotle disputes Feser’s Aristotle. According to the latter, “everything with a regular or predictable effect, including inanimate substances, also has a final cause directing it to that outcome.” According to the former, only “living organisms have ends or final causes,” along with human artifacts. Most strikingly for Ellmers’ Aristotle, “Inanimate objects” have no natural ends: “These effects are not why these objects exist; they don’t have a why.” In other words, only souls or ensouled beings have natural ends. Inorganic (soulless) beings do not, if Ellmers’ Aristotle is right. (Whether or not Ellmers’ Aristotle holds that celestial bodies have souls, and thus natural ends is not mentioned, although this would surely be a great problem “for many people today.”)

For Ellmers’ Aristotle, the natural universe appears so divided that man and other living beings have natural ends but nonliving beings have no natural ends. This Aristotle does not tell us in this article how a uni-verse can be a single reality, part of which is teleological, part or most of which is non-teleological.

Leo Strauss ends his introduction to Natural Right and History with this problem, but he identifies it as a problem for “modern men. We are all in the grip of the same difficulty” or “dilemma”: we are compelled to accept a modern dualism: a teleological science of man and a nonteleological natural science. For classical philosophy, on the other hand, “All natural beings have a natural end, a natural destiny, which determines what kind of operation is good for them.” It is not Aristotle or scholasticism which created our dilemma. “The teleological view of the universe, of which the teleological view of man forms a part, would seem to have been destroyed by modern natural science.” For Aristotle, according to Strauss, it isn’t “inanimate objects” but “the heavens and their bodies” which determine whether the universe is teleological or mechanical.

Moreover, while Ellmers is critical of Feser the Thomist for his determined effort to interpret everything teleologically, Strauss criticizes “the modern followers of Thomas Aquinas” for the opposite reason—accepting both nonteleological natural science and a teleological science of man. Strauss says that both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas himself held “a comprehensive view.”

It is not as clear to me as it is to Ellmers that Aristotle confined teleology to organic beings. In Physics he denies that inanimate things such as rain and heat come to be by luck, coincidence, chance, etc., but “they occur for the sake of something…all such things exist by nature. There is, then, final cause in things which come to be or exist by nature.” (199a5-8) More strongly, at the end of Beta, Aristotle demands that the natural scientist state “the final cause” of natural things and not only their “matter” and “motions.” (200a32)

David Bolotin’s fascinating book, An Approach to Aristotle’s Physics, argues that Aristotle’s wrote his work on natural science esoterically, his teleological account of the world deliberately exaggerated in order to preclude “the alternative that this world might partly consist of, or otherwise owe its existence to, a mysterious and all-powerful god or gods.” Aristotle, according to him, was unable to disprove the possibility of a theological creation account. Does Ellmers ultimately agree with this nonteleological Aristotle? If so, aren’t we back to the problem from which he set out to rescue us, that the idea of natural rights on which our system of government is based rests on nothing outside of human will?

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Dennis Teti
on August 29, 2019 at 08:59:45 am

Thanks Dennis. I think you misunderstand the Physics.
Prompted this comment, and Pagan’s, I’ve decided to write something longer in response to these points. Give me a few days.

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Glenn Ellmers
on August 29, 2019 at 11:45:57 am

There has been some debate as to whether Aristotle embraced a coherent, classical theory of natural law in the strict sense, a teleologically-sensitive theory resting on firm theological foundations. I'm not among those who are persuaded that he did, but I do not intend to enter that debate here. What is more interesting philosophically is whether such a theory is rationally tenable, and I would contend that it is. Of course, such a theory goes beyond the proper methodological boundaries of modern empirical science.

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P.A. Pagan, Ph.D.
on August 29, 2019 at 12:11:56 pm

For Glenn Ellmers:
I am getting confused. So, I want to make sure I understand the nature of your complaint re Feser’s book. Is it that there is no case for natural teleology, even a non-reductive but biocentric based one, or is it that you prefer that Feser would have argued for his account of natural teleology on his own terms and not as one interpreting Aristotle? If it is the latter, then would you have preferred a neo- to an ian-?
Or is there some other complaint?
Thanks.

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Douglas Rasmussen
on August 29, 2019 at 13:38:04 pm

Apart from your critique of Feser on teleology of inanimate objects Glenn, it seems to me that your main disagreement is with the WAY Feser argued. I think you might belong to a different audience than the one Feser typically aims to persuade however. He usually has either the Analytic philosophy crowd or the Catholic philosophy crowd in mind, not so much the political philosophy or hard science crowd.

Feser's use of arguments from the scholastic manuals makes sense given the Catholic philosophy audience (and the fact, I might add, that many of the scholastic manuals contained fascinating arguments that have been unfairly dismissed).

Feser's arguments having an overall effect "like paging through a diner menu" is because that's the way analytic philosophy people argue, at least since David Lewis. Philosophy for them literally is a menu of options, with trade offs. Here is a very famous line from the introduction to Lewis' Collected Papers Volume 1 (1984):

"'The reader in search of knock-down arguments in favor of my theories will be disappointed, and this because philosophical theories are only rarely, if ever, refutable by knock-down arguments. What we learn from the objections advanced against our theories is the price that we will have to pay, the philosophical commitments that we will have to take on board if they are to escape refutation. The question then is 'which prices are worth paying' and 'On this question we may still differ.' What weight we give to each of our philosophical beliefs and linguistic intuitions and what weight we give to each of our philosophical opinions is up to us. Once the menu of well-worked-out theories is before us, philosophy is a matter of opinion."

That may or may not be relativism at the end of the day, but it's how analytic philosophers today argue

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CJ Wolfe
on August 29, 2019 at 18:09:51 pm

Aristotle is irrelevant to the founding and LONANG, unless you were a heretic like Jefferson, Franklin or john Adams, in which case they were the slim minority. In fact, even those losers claimed Nature's God was Jehovah.

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Oft
on August 29, 2019 at 18:11:35 pm

I agree there is a natural teleology for living things — and for the cosmos in a very elemental and “homogenous” sense . (I’m going to write something separately on this.)
I think Feser claims something much broader than what Aristotle says, so I wish he (Feser) had just presented his own natural metaphysics in his own name.

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Glenn Ellmers
on August 29, 2019 at 18:16:04 pm

Fair enough.

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Glenn Ellmers
on August 29, 2019 at 18:42:46 pm

Wow. What a remarkably candid statement about philosophy. ‘Cuz, while unschooled in the particulars, I have long pondered teleology (as I understand it) in these terms: What's the point? What does it get us?

If you have evidence that teleology is “true,” then it may make no difference to you whether it has any utility. But others have conceded that we have no method to demonstrate teleology’s “truth”—at least by the standards of science or mathematical proof. Which does not pose an insurmountable problem for a theory. After all, I understand that cosmologists do not claim to have proof for dark matter/dark energy; rather, they find that this hypothesis helps to explain otherwise unexplained anomalies in the data.

So, does the teleology hypothesis help us explain some otherwise unexplained matter?

I conjecture that the unexplained matter is the Socratic one: How should I live? And here are some conjectures that might involve teleology:

1: Story-tellers, in creating a story, include details for a reason. They generally know how the story will end, and determine what details to provide the audience in order to provide a context for understanding the story’s ending. Likewise, philosophers/theologians might conjecture that each of our lives, or history overall, is just a story being told by God, and God has a purpose for everything in the story. Humans should strive to learn that purpose and live in accordance with it. (One consequence of this understanding of teleology is that both sentient and non-sentient things would have such a purpose. The “author of history” would have as much reason for creating Joe as for creating the boulder that eventually squashes Joe.)

2: In a pre-Darwin era, people observe that species seem to act in a manner that promotes the propagation of their species. They conclude that God desires this result because, otherwise, we’d observe species that take a variety of attitudes about propagation. (A Darwinian might argue that in fact we DO observe individuals that take a variety of attitudes about propagation. But any species that did not tend toward propagation would naturally die out, and would therefore no longer be around to be observed—no divine mandate required.)

I don’t find Conjecture 2 very inspiring. Conjecture 1 triggers some reflections about time-travel and alternative universes, causing me to ponder that there might be something there. But otherwise, I can’t say that I see the conceptual need for which teleology is the solution.

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nobody.really
on August 29, 2019 at 19:29:18 pm

I’m not sure if this is responsive to what you are asking, but here is a thought in terms of considering, Why does teleology matter? What does it add to our understanding of anything,

It seems that wanting to know the “why“ is a pretty basic part of really knowing anything. See _Phaedo_. And it really does help us comprehend what’s going, how nature works.

Here’s an example. A winged, feathered biped gathers twigs and leaves and carries them to a tree limb. Every child knows that means a bird is building a nest. But this requires acknowledging that the bird’s action have a why, a purpose, an end. Though some very dogmatic evolutionary biologists in the last century (at the peak of the Modern Synthesis) would go ‘round and ‘round to avoid acknowledging any “purpose” in biology, common sense tells us that this is a kind triumph of ideology over science. An ornithologist who can’t explain nest-building as a purposive activity is suffering from a kind of self-inflicted brain damage.

Or so Aristotle would suggest.

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Glenn Ellmers
on August 29, 2019 at 20:40:30 pm

We can't understand that birds build nests without teleology?

I could imagine people could differ about the bird's mental state--whether a bird has consciousness of building a nest or whether nest-building for a bird is like blood-pumping for a human, something that happens without conscious choice.

And I could understand people arguing that the choice to distinguish "build a nest" from other aspects of a bird's routine may reflect a human sensibility rather than a bird's sensibility. (To a bird, nest-building may reflect just one more aspect of instinctual behavior indistinct from other aspects. Conversely, the act of laying down primary sticks may strike a bird as fundamentally different than the act of adding smaller sticks, and thus the bird might not categorize these two activities under the common heading "building a nest.")

What I don't understand is how we get from more or less POSITIVE descriptions to NORMATIVE descriptions. How do we get from "Birds build nests to propagate their species" to "Birds SHOULD build nests, and birds that build burrows are wrong/bad/contrary to God's plan"?

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nobody.really
on August 29, 2019 at 20:50:57 pm

Dr West:

Ellmers claims he has not had time to digest your *new* view on Hobbes. am I to take this to mean that you now would credit Hobbes with a higher influence on the "Political Theory" of the founding? - or am i stretching this a bit.

BTW: Excellent work on the book.

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gabe
on August 30, 2019 at 02:57:31 am

Glenn,

Ok, then this passage from Den Uyl and Rasmussen, THE PERFECTIONIST TURN (pp.220-221)
might be of interest to you:

David S. Oderberg suggests that we understand natural teleology or
natural function broadly—that is, as being applicable to anything
that has a natural specific activity (usually in the context of larger
events or processes)—but then to also note that the kind of teleology
or function that has value-significance is one that is due to causes
and effects within one and the same being (immanent causation), not
resulting from causes and effects belonging to different beings (tran-
sient causation). Hence, it is only to living things that teleology has
value or significance. He states:

Stones and electrons might have functions but they cannot flourish, or
behave better or worse, rightly or wrongly, or be harmed, satisfied, or
possess any of the fundamental normative states belonging to subjects of
immanent causation, that is living things. There is no mere continuum
here, but a point at which nature is carved at the joints. Yet the norma-
tive functions of living things are as real as the nonnormative functions
of everything else in the cosmos. Natural goodness is as real as natural
viscosity, natural harm as natural radioactivity.

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Douglas Rasmussen
on August 30, 2019 at 09:35:38 am

Perhaps, we should be stating it somewhat differently:

"How do we get from “Birds build nests to propagate their species” to “Birds SHOULD build nests, and birds that build burrows are wrong/bad/contrary to God’s plan”?

SHOULD READ:

“CERTAIN Birds build nests to propagate their species” to “Thus, CERTAIN Birds SHOULD build nests, and CERTAIN OTHER birds that build burrows are NOT wrong/bad/contrary to God’s plan”? - but also are reaching their "propagative" telos.

This is a simple recognition that categories (species) may at times be too broad; not necessarily that each of the elements in the category does not have a certain end / purpose or goal.

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gabe
on August 30, 2019 at 10:00:04 am

“CERTAIN Birds build nests to propagate their species” to “Thus, CERTAIN Birds SHOULD build nests...."

Thanks for the clarification, gabe. I mean to focus on the is/ought distinction. Even the addition of the clarifying word "certain" does not help met get from a (more or less) factual generalization to an admonition.

This is a simple recognition that categories (species) may at times be too broad....

This gets closer to my point: The fact that certain behavior may seem necessary/adaptive for a species tells me little about a duty for an individual.

Or, at least, I cannot fathom how Catholicism gets there. Catholicism may shun homosexuality in part based on the need for procreative sex for the perpetuation of the species--yet Catholicism forthrightly acknowledges that certain categories of people (priests, nuns, married people who have separated) should adopt lifestyles that preclude procreation. Clearly I don't understand this. Perhaps I also MISunderstand this--but perhaps not.

p.s. I looked at 2013 discussion of mine on First Things, and some yahoo named gabe was commenting there as well. Have you been stalking me? : - )

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nobody.really
on August 30, 2019 at 10:54:11 am

"Have you been stalking me?"

Oops. caught - now I suspect that the Behavioral Sciences Unit of (formerly James comey's) FBI will be on to me. (BTW: I think I was there first, same at LLB. who is stalking who/).

But seriously, nobody, it strikes me that so much of what you argue is a form of exceptionalism. That is to say that there appears to be a preference for citing the exception to any general proposition.

Here is something from McGinnis essay today on Justice Holmes:

"[Justice Holmes] wrote in his famous dissent in Lochner v. New York that “General propositions do not decide concrete cases.” This famous sentence in fact echoes Bowen, who argued at greater length, but to the same effect, that “Absolute certainty belongs to the proposition only when couched in general terms. It can be applied to particular cases only by approximation.” Unitarianism here can be seen as the halfway house to progressivism and living constitutionalism."

This is a not unreasonable assertion. However, it is fraught with certain dangers. In the example cited above, we observe a "political" or juridical danger. Problematic (to some, of course) but no more problematic than in the context of philosophy or any discipline that seeks to establish or support a normative proposition - as you illustrate above with regard to physics and "dark matter"
Yet, it ought to be clear that some attempt to explain both life and the universe, and all contained therein requires our best approximations of what is and, as one commenter noted above, "The WHY" of it all.

It would appear that the "WHY" is fundamental, is innate within humans, although probably not within a neutrino (quantum physicists aside). In such pursuits, we may mistakenly (or not) assume that for all things extant there is a specified end or telos. Again, PERHAPS, such mental gymnastics may serve ONLY to provide freedom of action for those who compelled by their innate nature MUST know the WHY.

Simple example:

The telos of a red light at an intersection is to allow for the safe passage of both pedestrians and automobiles. What if this were in dispute? How would your freedom of action be affected.

So too with many of the "exceptions' that you are notable for citing. (This is a comment not a critique). As we not only seek to know the why, we appear also to be in need of the WHY in order that we may know the HOW - How are we to behave? How are we to move through the world, etc etc.

Some have evn argued that existence is nothing more than intelligence (or even simple DATA) seeking to understand itself. The task is made immeasurably more difficult when primarily "exceptions" are highlighted.

In the Holmes issue, the Justice thought he had found a solution. Take the methodology for common law courts and apply it to the "constituent" law. In so doing, he screwed up COTUS.
Are we doing the same with more general propositions and our ability to apprehend the WHY of it all?

Just a question that I am 'STALKING" - Ha!

Now, the gradkids are waking up and THE WHY of it all has become immanently apparent.

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gabe
on August 30, 2019 at 12:01:47 pm

Again, thanks for batting these concepts around with me. As stalkers go, you seem like a nice one--and with good taste in wine! Then again....

Still, I surmise that people who embrace teleology/natural law believe that they are articulating universal ideas akin to laws of physics--ideas that should not admit exceptions.

I acknowledge that people tend to seek out patterns/rationales in what they experience. I surmise that this tendency proves adaptive because the harms that arise from false positives exceed the harms that arise from failing to seek out patterns/rationales. But that does not lead me to conclude that each category of thing has one, all-purpose "telos." And I regard the propensity to draw this conclusion as a kind of cognitive bias.

Thus, I don't think that a streetlight has a cause. I expect the person who designed the streetlight may have had an end in might when designing it. I expect the person who built the streetlight had some end in mind in building it. I expect the person who erected the streetlight had some end in mind in erecting it. But to suggest that a non-sentient object--even a man-made one--has one all-purpose "telos" seems to impede critical thinking more than aid it.

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nobody.really
on August 30, 2019 at 13:17:39 pm

I occasionally encounter people who purport to embrace libertarianism AND teleology. I understand libertarianism to argue for letting people act as they will within their own sphere of autonomy, absent their consent to be bound (e.g., by contract). And I understand teleology to argue, among other things, that people's choices should be constrained by their telos, regardless of their consent.

I surmise that libertarians can embrace teleology as a kind of private religion, lacking an enforcement mechanism. But otherwise, this does not strike me as an obvious combination.

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nobody.really
on August 30, 2019 at 14:14:45 pm

Quite so:

Thus the difference between sentience and mere existence.

Recall First Things (not the blog but from Hannibal Lector)
What is the thing in itself. It is a traffic light - and nothing more.
What is its purpose? I suppose that depends upon a) who designed it, b) who installed it and c) what the installer intended for it to accomplish. Recall that some decades ago the ChiComms allowed you to proceed on RED (so they claimed),
Yet the light itself is blissfully oblivious of this. It DOES what it IS!
Not so the designer.
The traffic light neither asks How or WHY - it simply is the thing in itself.

Any other purpose is of human origin.
Some even argue that the universe is of human origin (doubtful even in the attenuated quantum physics perspective), others say divine.
What is clear is that all human attempts to ascribe motive, purpose and even (if not especially means; see: dark matter) changes not just its description but its telos (again a human construct).

what is not clear is whether there is definitive certainty, absent some component of "revelation", that humans have a telos, as it is also quite clear that REASON alone is insufficient to our comprehension.

Heck, even TIME is nothing more than a human construct, useful no doubt as a method for measuring change- but it also does not have a telos.

You are of course correct - things are what they are MADE to be - AND that is VARIABLE and a function of the perceived ends (telos) attributed to them by humans and MORE importantly the self-perceived TELOS of that particular human being.

Need I say that such a state, if given free exercise, leads to chaos or entropy?

Perhaps, human telos is to compromise!

seeya

and never question the good sense I have in wine. after all, I am a guinea / dago / wop - it is in our blood.
I won't tell you about the outstanding Sangiovese I just purchased from Washington State. It may have a telos - thus, I will have to drink it before it reaches its telos (END).

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gabe
on September 01, 2019 at 22:03:29 pm

Thank you for citing those helpful texts Prof. Rasmussen. In addition, I agree wholeheartedly with your comment: "There is even more work done on this topic that should not be ignored. Before one writes off natural teleology as irrelevant, see these works and the works cited in a previous comment." (For instance, Mariska Leunissen, Allan Gotthelf, "'What's Teleology Got To Do With It?' A Reinterpretation of Aristotle's _Generation of Animals_ V," _Phronesis_ 55 (2010), pp. 325-56; Etienne Gilson, _From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again: A Journey in Final Causality, Species and Evolution_, John Lyon (trans.) https://www.amazon.com/Aristotle-Darwin-Back-Again-Causality/dp/1586171690 . What Gilson has to say about the limits of mechanism, pp. 105-19, is quite interesting.) Also, the philosophical distinction between an extrinsic telos and an intrinsic telos is helpful. Of course, one may ask also about the ultimate extrinsic source of an entity's intrinsic telos, the same extrinsic source which, as primary efficient cause, actualizes an finite being's essence. As regards teleology, one key indication of the significance, in Aristotle's thought, of final causality among the classical four causes can be found in Aristotle's _Physics_ II.2 and II.3.

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P.A. Pagan, Ph.D.
on September 04, 2019 at 06:02:04 am

[…] say.  It seems that Glenn Ellmers has succumbed to this temptation, and for just these reasons, in his recent review of my book Aristotle’s Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and Biological […]

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Image of On Reviewing Imaginary Books: Ed Feser Responds to Glenn Ellmers
On Reviewing Imaginary Books: Ed Feser Responds to Glenn Ellmers
on September 06, 2019 at 00:32:30 am

Flamability doesn't cause phosphorus. The final cause of the phosphorus, its purpose is to produce a flame.

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Bill McEnaney
on September 07, 2019 at 04:31:53 am

Mr. Glenn Ellmers, with all due respect, Prof. Feser gives a pretty devastating rebuttal and critique of your review:
https://www.lawliberty.org/2019/09/04/on-reviewing-imaginary-books-ed-feser-responds-to-glenn-ellmers/

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Tritium
on September 10, 2019 at 11:36:57 am

Your first sentence contradicts your second sentence.

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Glenn Ellmers
on September 10, 2019 at 11:48:03 am

The editors have allowed me a brief sur-rebuttal which is scheduled to run on Friday.

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Glenn Ellmers
on September 13, 2019 at 14:26:23 pm

Thanks,all for the thoughtful exchanges.

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Ken masugi
on September 13, 2019 at 18:04:05 pm

[…] Professor Feser’s response to my review, one would never guess that I had described his book Aristotle’s Revenge as a welcome contribution to metaphysical realism, and noted how he […]

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Image of The Cloud of “Tradition” 
The Cloud of “Tradition” 
on September 18, 2019 at 16:50:48 pm

[…] say. It seems that Glenn Ellmers has succumbed to this temptation, and for just these reasons, in his recent review of my book Aristotle’s Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and Biological […]

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Image of Ed Feser Responds to Glenn Ellmers – DANG KY NHAN HIEU SAN PHAM
Ed Feser Responds to Glenn Ellmers – DANG KY NHAN HIEU SAN PHAM

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