Even allowing for the political commentator’s fondness for hyperbole, it is still unfortunate how frequently we hear some variant of the claim that “America has never been more divided.” This is ahistorical nonsense. Compared to today, our divisions were greater, and our politics more violent, in the 1960s and 1970s. A century before that, the situation was much worse. That does not mean our democracy is presently functioning well. Furthermore, although it is not accurate to say that America has never been more polarized than it is today, we are dysfunctional in new ways.

Despite institutions designed to delegate power to different levels of government, American politics is thoroughly nationalized. Although the United States is incredibly diverse, our two major political parties are increasingly homogeneous. Each of our fifty states faces different challenges and has different demographic and economic profiles, yet our state parties are becoming interchangeable. Their platforms look largely the same in each state. In Congress, politicians would rather accomplish nothing than be caught engaging in bipartisan dealmaking. All American political life now revolves around presidential elections, and Congress members focus primarily on obstructing or advancing a president’s agenda. In the electorate, voters have developed unhealthy attachments to their parties. Party affiliation for many of us has become a powerful source of social identity, leading us to circle the wagons around bad actors who happen to share our political affiliation—and to despise everyone on the other side. 

To better understand how this shift came about, I recommend Partisan Nation: The Dangerous New Logic of American Politics in a Nationalized Era by political scientists Paul Pierson and Eric Schickler. The authors make a strong argument that our political institutions no longer work as intended, leading to our present dysfunction and, they fear, setting the stage for future right-wing authoritarianism. The book’s explanation for how we reached our current situation is genuinely insightful, which makes up for its less convincing final chapters. The good news is that the authors’ alarmist conclusions were not especially persuasive, and I finished the book less pessimistic about the future than I was before.

Pierson and Schickler explain the genius of James Madison’s approach to institutional design. Breaking with the traditional argument that republican government can only work in a small, homogenous society, Madison flipped that logic on its head. In a small republic, building a majority coalition capable of trampling on minority rights is relatively easy. In a large, extended republic, however, there are too many different competing factions with contradictory interests for permanent, tyrannical majorities to take hold. As Madison put it, “Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.” It is an open question, however, whether this logic continues to apply in the US.

Because the United States has been so diverse, with different regions and interest groups making different demands, parties had to be flexible in their agendas. A representative from the Mid-Atlantic would have a very different constituency, and thus have a very different agenda, from a representative from the Great Plains, even if they shared a party label. Pierson and Schickler provide a thorough discussion of earlier periods of American history supposedly marked by partisan polarization, such as the 1890s. They note that these earlier periods were also characterized by strong state parties that pursued different agendas depending on the local and regional conditions.

This diversity within the two parties continued for much of the twentieth century. In the Democratic Party, the Southern Democrats had a very different approach to race than their Northern counterparts. We also saw this in the Republican Party, where more progressive Republicans continued to perform well in New England even after the rest of the party had become more consistently conservative. This is no longer the case. 

The authors suggest this can be largely traced to developments that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. The Civil Rights Movement, and the subsequent realignment of Southern whites into the Republican Party, played a key role in creating more cohesive political parties. The Civil Rights Movement had other long-term consequences. In its aftermath, the principle of “states’ rights” was viewed as inherently suspicious by the left, which came to view all appeals to state sovereignty as racist dog whistles—regardless of the issue under consideration.

Civil rights legislation also opened the floodgates to a more active federal government, even on issues that had nothing to do with race. This era resulted in the “expansion and nationalization of policy.” The extension of federal authority raised the stakes of congressional and presidential elections. As a result, “winning and losing in politics became more consequential.” 

Progressive Democrats pushed an ambitious agenda, including “rising and more centralized social spending, a very large expansion of the federal regulatory state, and imposition of federal control (exercised either through legislation or through decisions of the courts) over matters that had previously been left to localities, states, or the private sector.” Business interests understandably responded by becoming better organized and more partisan. 

Other economic changes disconnected from politics were equally important. As the American economy developed in the twentieth century, “economic power shifted to national or global firms.” Geographic economic differences became less salient in a world of global supply chains and corporate consolidation. The Madisonian vision assumed different regions would have significantly different economic interests. This is decreasingly true, the authors argue, as corporate elites, regardless of where their businesses are technically headquartered, have similar interests across the country. This has “weakened the independent expression of purely local economic voices in American society.”

Changes in our media landscape are also to blame. Local journalism has suffered a precipitous decline. Across the nation, we mostly follow national news, getting the same perspectives and following the same issues regardless of where we live. We are also retreating into ideological information silos, preferring to hear information from partisan cheerleaders. The authors suggest that this is especially a problem on the right, where talk radio and Fox News present an especially skewed vision of the political world. Several years ago, I would have questioned their claim that partisan media is a greater problem on the right, but in the Trump era, this has become more difficult to deny.

The democratization of our presidential primaries has also exacerbated these issues. State party leaders play a smaller role in choosing candidates, as “ordinary voters and ideologically oriented activists became more important players in the presidential selection process.” Compared to state leaders, these activists are more concerned about ideological purity than issues specifically concerning their states.

The declining importance of state party leaders has also hindered their ability to reorient their agendas and talking points depending on local conditions. Republicans in California and Democrats in Alabama have less ability to shape their platforms to appeal to their states. In primary elections, voters often prefer ideologues who cannot win, rejecting moderates with greater potential appeal in challenging partisan environments.

As a result, our two parties are incredibly cohesive across the country. Republicans and Democrats push a similar agenda in every state, and the number of cross-cutting cleavages that encourage bipartisan cooperation and more contingent political relationships are disappearing. The Madisonian framework has broken down, resulting in gridlock, extreme partisanship, and zero-sum thinking.

There are many reasons to be disturbed by the trajectory of American politics, but much of the authors’ doomsaying feels unwarranted. I agree with some of their concerns. January 6 was a national embarrassment, for instance. The degree to which many conservatives remain nonchalant about that fiasco, which could easily have been horrifically worse, should be a permanent stain on the movement. But the notion that it augurs a future, more successful attempt to subvert the democratic process seems unlikely. 

All signs indicate that President Trump is a sui generis political figure. He has no obvious heir apparent, and no other right-wing politicians have proven capable of generating comparable enthusiasm from the Republican base. The Trump era of US politics will eventually come to an end, and I am hopeful that what follows will be less contentious. 

Some of Partisan Nation’s other concerns about “democratic backsliding” seem farfetched. Their argument that voter ID laws are particularly insidious was unconvincing. As the authors acknowledge, the evidence that such laws drive down turnout is weak. Furthermore, similar laws are common in other democracies, where they are not apparently controversial. If this is one of the stronger arguments for the claim that we are creeping toward authoritarianism, we have little reason to panic.

Pierson and Schickler’s concerns about US politics are partly driven by their own preferences. In this era of intemperate partisanship, it is difficult for either party to successfully pursue major policy initiatives at the national level. This gives Republicans an advantage because the GOP is less likely to pursue a transformative economic agenda. Traditional conservatives can often “win” simply by blocking the other side. This leaves progressives at a disadvantage, but the authors should remember that it also hinders the goals of right-wing populists, who, for example, will have a difficult time pursuing their most radical changes to our nation’s immigration system, regardless of who wins this November.

Given how closely divided we are, it is very difficult for any party to pursue its agenda. Even if Trump again becomes president, his ability to transform federal policy will be limited. The odds that he will ever enjoy, say, a filibuster-proof majority in the US Senate are slim, and in terms of major policy changes, his second term would likely be no more significant than his first.

Partisan rancor and policy stalemates, as such, are not good things. Nonetheless, political institutions that are biased in favor of the status quo can have certain benefits. It is true that, at present, it is very difficult for progressives to successfully pursue an ambitious economic agenda. Given the degree to which the US economy continues to outperform our peers across the globe, however, I am grateful that this is the case. 

The authors acknowledge that the expansion of federal prerogatives was one reason for the nationalization of US politics and a source of contemporary polarization. Yet, they never suggest that the expansion of federal power was itself a mistake. In fact, they make it clear that they want the federal government to do even more. Another interpretation of this development, however, is that our constitutional system is working as intended. Our politics has become characterized by stalemate precisely because the federal government has usurped so many powers that properly belong to the states.

As it becomes harder for Congress to pass meaningful legislation, political entrepreneurs across the ideological spectrum may give more of their attention to state politics and policy, where it is quite common for one party to control both the executive and legislative branches. The authors are opposed to this possibility because they do not like the policies promoted in red states, but the specific policies aside, this may be a salutary development. From a different perspective, it is a necessary correction to the nationalization of politics.

The book’s arguments about potential solutions will not convince readers who do not share the authors’ policy and partisan preferences. Some of their suggestions, such as expanding the Supreme Court, seem motivated by their desire to help progressives score more political and policy victories, rather than any other important principle. This is a legitimate motive for supporting a major institutional change, but we should be honest about our objectives. Their case for ranked-choice voting, however, was more compelling, and I hope more states will experiment with alternative voting systems in the future. 

The nationalization of American politics and the decline of mediating institutions have harmed American public life. However, gridlock and partisan anger are not the worst possible outcomes for the country. In fact, to the extent they hobble the ambitions of genuine radicals, they may serve an important purpose. At a time when vocal elements of the progressive left and the populist right call for bad policies that threaten American prosperity, I hesitate to endorse institutional changes that make it easier for either side to pursue their goals.