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Wrestling with the Far Right

What does the far right want? This question motivates the editors and authors of the excellent and timely volume, Contemporary Far-Right Thinkers and the Future of Liberal Democracy. The answer, however, is elusive. As the editors themselves acknowledge, the goals of far-right groups and thinkers converge and diverge in various ways. Yet, while the reader of this volume will not finish with a determinate sense of what the far right is, they will notice the recurrence of a few prominent themes. Focusing on these themes facilitates a much deeper understanding of what drives the far right, as well as providing a point of departure for those (like myself) who seek to defend liberal democracy from the more illiberal aspects of these movements.

The movements and thinkers that constitute the re-emergence of far-right political philosophy operate in the West—they surface in places where liberalism and egalitarianism have dominated in the last century. Throughout the 15 chapters in the book, references to the European far right (EFR), Nouvelle droite (French New Right), and the American alt-right (alternative Right) abound. These groups garner the most attention in the volume, yet similar groups covered from locations like Russia, Slovakia, and Australia are a testament to the global reach of the far right. The influence of the first-generation thinkers (circa late 1970s) like Alain de Benoist, Guillaume Faye, and Pat Buchanan is continued (though modified) by current thinkers like Daniel Friberg, Martin Lacko, Alexander Dugin, Jason Jorjani, and the pseudonymous Bronze Age Pervert (BAP).

As already mentioned, substantial differences exist in the thought and actions of these various groups and figures. Nonetheless, we can identify a number of prominent themes: anti-elitism, and the idea that the far right speaks for the “real” world stripped of elitist illusions; concern for demographic change (the Great Replacement); cultural decay and the need for cultural regeneration; nationalism and identitarianism, which is concerned either with history and culture or with “ethnopolitics”; a re-emergence of “civilizational” theorizing (think Samuel Huntington); respect for difference, or a call to question the putative benefits of liberal egalitarianism; anti-capitalism, because they believe capitalism requires an undifferentiated mass of rootless consumers; engagement not with politics but “metapolitics,” or the changing of culture; and gendered theorizing, emphasizing masculinity and the diminution of virility experienced in spiritually empty liberal societies. The list of themes may be large and unwieldy, but the scholars involved adeptly explain them and often evince their interrelatedness. Systematic treatment of the contemporary far right is long overdue, in my view, as the academy has been slow to take the growth of these (mostly) online movements seriously. For that reason alone, this volume is a welcome and important contribution.

A quick note about the scholarship is in order. Edited volumes often suffer from inconsistency on the quality metric, but this volume is a welcome exception. James McAdams and Alejandro Castrillon have assembled a group of distinguished scholars, and nearly all chapters are well-conceived, well-written, and thoroughly edifying. The lone exception is a chapter on the relationship between classical liberalism and the online Australian magazine Quillette, which is poorly organized and conceptually opaque. Also impressive is the cohesion of the project itself—each author knows what the other authors are writing about, and frequent references to each other’s chapters result in a unified product, or at least as unified as an edited volume can be.

The Metapolitics of the Far Right

It is impractical to address all the aforementioned themes, covered over the course of 15 chapters, in a short review. What we can do is evaluate the impact of these political and cultural agendas, both in Europe and the United States. In general, the far-right is a much stronger political force in Europe than America. As George Hawley uncovers in his chapter, the influence of the American far right (alt-right) drastically decreased since the infamous “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia in 2017. According to Hawley, the attempt to turn the alt-right into a “real world political movement,” which began with Trump’s candidacy and the elevation of Steve Bannon, was short-lived, due to widespread rejection of the more extreme white nationalist agenda evident in Charlottesville and to the incapacity of the Alt-Right to organize politically. After a brief moment in the sun (surely aided by the media’s overexposure of some of these events), the American Alt-Right was swiftly returned to its status “as a mostly online subculture.”

It does not follow, however, that the alt-right’s influence has vanished. Rather, it has returned to what it does best: engaging in “metapolitics” (influencing culture more broadly). The Bronze Age Pervert (BAP) leads this effort, which is traced in a fascinating chapter by Josh Vandiver. BAP leverages internet technology (Twitter, podcasts, etc.), masculinity, and the general disenchantment and youthful angst of young men to direct the alt-right culture war. BAP’s call for a rebirth of the pioneering spirit and bold, adventurous activity has enjoyed much greater appeal than some other alt-right strategies (like those of Pat Buchanan or the “Groyper” movement of Nick Fuentes), which focus on more straightforwardly political objectives such as curbing immigration. I am not suggesting that metapolitical debate online has not influenced debates over immigration or other issues within the GOP, but calculating such influence is a messy and imperfect task.

A “metapolitical” strategy prospers in Europe, as well, but it coincides with some genuine political power. In the French New Right, for example, first-generation thinkers like de Benoist adopted the Gramscian idea that capturing “cultural power” is more important than garnering political power. As McAdams relates in his chapter, this generation of far-right thinkers was relatively moderate, democratic, and primarily theoretical. It wasn’t until the next generation of “Identitarians” (led by Guillaume Faye) that practical political activism became the norm, predicated on a platform of anti-immigration. The issue of immigration draws more attention in Europe than in America (despite its increasing salience in American conservatism). From France and Italy to Germany, Poland, and Scandinavia, real political purchase resides in an anti-immigrant position. Declaring that rampant immigration (particularly from Islamic countries) has eroded the cultural identities of their nations, far-right political parties have sometimes gained in excess of 20% of the popular “vote” in these places. Be that as it may, the younger (third generation) of the French New Right, the “New Vanguardists,” are evidently returning to the more moderate and metapolitical strategies of the first generation. A similar phenomenon of moderating political stances amongst the far right can be observed in many other places, such as America (Groypers) and Russia (Young Conservatives), as well.

In fact, the most extreme and illiberal versions of far-right themes appear where they are primarily confined to the realm of ideas, with little political organization. This is true of the alt-right in America, where BAP enjoys significant influence and the outspoken Aryan fascist Jason Jorjani (see Ronald Beiner’s chapter) make no bones about seeking the destruction of the liberal order. Interestingly, José Pedro Zúquete discovers that these American figures played a major inspirational role in the creation of the alt-right Scandza Forum in Scandanavia. Jorjani and Scandza are quite comfortable promoting white identity politics (WIP), but again do not accumulate much real political influence.             

The difficulty of grasping the real impact of the far right globally is quite high, and this volume does not fully resolve this problem. Despite its undoubtedly positive contribution, I was left with one minor complaint. The title promises to both examine the contemporary far right and to assess the future of democracy in light of these thinkers and movements. The first task it accomplishes with aplomb, but the second is conspicuously unfinished. Outside of perfunctory comments about the “illiberal” nature of many of these ideas, most of the authors do not seriously engage with the question of how liberalism will be challenged in the near future.

These ideas must be wrestled with, not condemned outright and ignored. In this way we might achieve a future in which liberalism is rejuvenated by more acceptance of difference and enlivened pluralism.

Liberalism, Conservatism, and the Far Right

In his conclusion, Castrillon does a little more, rightly emphasizing the particular threat that identity politics pose and further comparing the contemporary far right with that of the last century (e.g., Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy). It is worth quoting Castrillon’s conclusion:

Yet, as helpful as [the comparison between past and present] is, it proves dissatisfying given the lengths that many of these thinkers go to distance themselves from fascism as it was experienced in the twentieth century. Theoretically, most seem removed from the extremes of the past: Arguments in favor of superior peoples and races are rarely invoked, nor do they call for the extermination of internal and external enemies. Politically, they avoid militant action and prefer to work within the rule of law: There is no demand for one-party rule, no adamant avowal of ultra-nationalism with imperialistic ambitions.

Such an assessment provides some consolation, to be sure, but Castrillon also identifies the central problem: “Identity placed above all other values poses a serious challenge to liberal democracy . . . Identity, which is so flexible, fluid, and undetermined, based on memories and forgetfulness, is now anointed the arbiter of all other liberties.” This is as close as we get to an answer about what the future might hold for the liberal order, and I think this question could have been addressed more thoroughly throughout the book.

I call this complaint minor, however, because I think this task is the responsibility of future scholars. Once we have a better handle on what the far right wants, we can begin to assess where it conflicts with the liberal order. But this requires serious engagement with these ideas, an engagement I’m not certain is forthcoming. My sense (proffered humbly and without certainty) is that most liberals and moderates today have an allergic reaction to any ideas coming from the far right. The allegation of fascism directed towards almost anyone on the right has become alarmingly common, akin to the charge of communism to those on the left during the McCarthy era. As Emma Planinc observes in her chapter, anyone who suggests the need for cultural regeneration, points to problems of decay or hypocrisy within liberalism, or recommends we bring something back from the past to revivify liberal democracy, is promptly labeled a fascist or proto-fascist. If that is the case, then call me a fascist, too. I’m a boring and predictable classical liberal who also witnesses stagnation in Western liberal societies, and I would like to see an increase in genuine liberal pluralism. Contestation of culture and values is required for a free, adaptive, energetic (and hopeful) society, and as long as cultural contests and debates over values occur within the broader liberal framework (under the rule of law, with individual rights, a private property regime, etc.), they are a positive activity.

The dilemma before us, then, is not the mere existence or re-emergence of the far right, just as the solution is not to ignore their ideas or seek ways to silence them (it is clear, we should note, that these ideas have significant traction with young conservatives is the West today). The challenge is to distinguish between the ideas so illiberal they threaten the liberal order and those that are compatible with it (I can’t resist urging that this seems at least as necessary for ideas on the far left, parsing which “woke” ideas can be integrated and which must be rejected outright).

Consider an example: perhaps the most prominent concern in the far-right literature is national or societal decay and the need for regeneration. There are two proposed responses to this concern, one much more illiberal than the other. The first is to think of the nation in terms of territory, history, borders, and citizenship. To return to cultural roots, mining shared history to find the ideas, values, and institutions that constitute a nation and give it its particular strength. This can plausibly be done without overturning or undermining the liberal framework. (Of course, some cultural institutions will have to be rejected—Sharia law cannot coexist with the liberal legal system—but these will be the exception rather than the rule.) The second response is to advocate “ethnopolitics”; to champion difference; to focus on racial, religious, and ethnic traits; and to make these the measure of identity. In the extreme case, this includes beliefs of ethnic superiority and eugenics, but even in the moderate case of emphasizing ethnic difference above all else, the result is a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural order that seriously threatens a liberal one.

However one might respond to these ideas, they are not going away, and it’s becoming increasingly clear that conservative political ideas and movements all over the globe are being transformed by the far right. These ideas must be wrestled with, not condemned outright and ignored. In this way, we might achieve a future in which liberalism is rejuvenated by more acceptance of difference and enlivened pluralism, improved through cultural regeneration, made less rigid and ideological, and perhaps more spiritually full. The alternative may be that liberalism is destroyed by identity politics domestically and militant nationalism internationally. We must get a better handle on these ideas to pursue the former and avoid the latter, and Contemporary Far-Right Thinkers and the Future of Liberal Democracy is a welcome step in this direction.

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