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Is Section 501(c)(3) a Form of Censorship?

Columbia Law School Professor Philip Hamburger is a prodigious and iconoclastic legal scholar, having previously authored provocative, deeply-researched books on religious freedom, judicial review, and administrative law—Separation of Church and State (2002), Law and Judicial Duty (2008), and Is Administrative Law Lawful? (2014), respectively—and many articles. His approach customarily combines legal history and a refreshingly-original perspective on familiar subjects, sometimes producing controversial results at odds with conventional thinking.

Hamburger’s latest subject, in Liberal Suppression (2018), is an inquiry into the legitimacy of restrictions on the political speech of non-profit organizations. [1] Section 501(c)(3) exempts religious, educational, and charitable organizations from federal income tax but denies them this exemption if they engage in campaign speech for or against any candidate for public office or devote a substantial part of their activities to propaganda or other attempts to influence legislation. Section 170(c) makes contributions to qualifying non-profits tax-deductible to the donor. According to Hamburger, these exemptions and deductions amount to “many billions of dollars annually.”

Most people’s knee-jerk reaction is that section 501(c)(3)’s restrictions are justified by the tax-exempt status such non-profit organizations applied for and received. Rejecting such preconceptions in his trademark fashion, Hamburger strongly disagrees. Although non-profits are free to express a wide range of opinions—even political opinions—outside of political contests, Hamburger views section 501(c)(3) as “an extraordinary abridgement of an essential freedom,” which ought to be considered unconstitutional. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court has unanimously upheld the lobbying restrictions in section 501(c)(3) [2], Liberal Suppression is nothing if not ambitious, but is it persuasive? Realizing that his arguments may appear to be an “uphill struggle,” early on Hamburger asks readers to “hold their skepticism in abeyance.”

After reading the book, my skepticism remains stubbornly intact.

Hamburger reminds the reader that from colonial times until the amendment of section 501(c)(3) in 1934 [3] (and further tightening in 1954, and again in 1987), which imposed the restrictions he finds objectionable, American clergy actively participated in politics from the pulpit. The timing of the 1934 and 1954 restrictions, he points out, coincides with a period of “liberal” [4] anti-Catholic sentiment in America. The principal culprits in Hamburger’s tale are nativists such as Ku Klux Klan imperial wizard Hiram Evans and then-Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, who faced a Catholic opponent in the 1954 senatorial primary.  Hamburger portrays them as the instigators of section 501(c)(3)’s “oppressive” political restrictions.

Hamburger suggests that the “sordid” restrictions were added to section 501(c)(3) in order to reduce the influence of the Catholic Church, but fails to prove that the motives of particular individuals were shared by Congress as a whole. He also concedes that the “theological liberals” who feared an “ecclesiastical threat to mental independence” saw a similar danger from traditional Protestant churches. Indeed, to some secular factions, “the threat to individuals came from all religious organizations and even all distinct religions.” The anti-Papist conspiracy was broad indeed.

Hamburger warns darkly that the restriction on religious speech has caused profound harm to churches and the polity, and suggests that the Tocquevillian benefits of private associations have been reduced by the “suppression” of speech from what Hamburger refers to as “idealistic organizations.” At the same time, Hamburger acknowledges that “there are limited empirical data on the effects of section 501(c)(3)’s speech restrictions—partly because the effects are difficult to measure, and partly because it is difficult to find a suitable control group.” He makes this point to argue that “any reassuring conclusion that the loss of messaging is minimal cannot be much more than speculation,” but the converse is equally true. Claims of harm are likewise speculative—and, to my mind, far-fetched. And, confusingly, Hamburger simultaneously argues that section 501(c)(3) constitutes an unconstitutional establishment of religion.

Non-profit organizations have substantial leeway to engage in speech short of political advocacy, and those feeling hamstrung by the restrictions of section 501(c)(3) can form section 501(c)(4) affiliates and section 527 political action committees, or simply forgo tax exempt status (and the concomitant tax deductibility of contributions under section 170(c)).  The success of political organizations such as Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition, and Concerned Women for America (to name just a few) demonstrate that politically-active believers are not silenced by section 501(c)(3). The right-to-life movement, which is largely driven by Christian activists, is very formidable. The LDS (Mormon) church led two successful ballot measures in California to protect traditional marriage, in 2000 and 2008. Given the vibrancy of talk radio, social media, and grassroots political movements (such as Tea Party activists and Trump supporters), it is questionable to state, as Hamburger does, that “many Americans have come to feel that they are politically impotent.” Populism is alive and well.

Hamburger asserts that “[c]hurches, schools, and charities…must pay a tax for exercising two of their First Amendment rights,” on the assumption that these entities were never properly subject to federal taxation and thus needed no exemption. (The subtitle of the book is Section 501(c)(3) and the Taxation of Speech.) The contrary view is that—absent an exemption—all organizations are subject to tax. Tax exemptions are a subsidy. The First Amendment doesn’t confer a right to engage in political activities using pre-tax dollars. Conceding that the restrictions of 501(c)(3) are not “distinctively severe,” Hamburger insists nonetheless that they are “grossly unconstitutional.” His reasoning rests in large part on arguing that, contra Regan, section 501(c)(3) reflects invidious discrimination designed to suppress disfavored ideas.  This “seemingly technical tax provision,” Hamburger avers, “was borne of dark ‘democratic’ anxieties that reek of prejudice.”

Hamburger vigorously challenges the assumption underlying much of the scholarship supporting section 501(c)(3)—that the section’s exemptions are merely “subsidies” or “tax expenditures,” which can be conditioned on compliance with the section’s restrictions. “The basic difficulty,” Hamburger argues, is that “if refraining from taxing amounted to spending, then all Americans would always be recipients of government largess.” Under this logic, Hamburger avers, the government’s decision to forgo a higher tax rate “could extend section 501(c)(3)’s restrictions to all Americans.” Hamburger properly objects to the concept that “the government is spending wherever it does not impose a higher tax rate.” Such an open-ended application of “tax expenditure theory” could justify sweeping restrictions on speech. However, section 501(c)(3) is a narrow  provision, not a broad rule. If one assumes that the Sixteenth Amendment authorizes the taxation of all corporate entities—even churches, schools, and charities—exempting those operating as non-profits does confer a privilege. Conditioning this privilege—a “subsidy” of sorts—on limited speech restrictions is not equivalent to authorizing blanket suppression of the constitutional rights of “all Americans.” Hamburger accuses proponents of tax expenditure theory of “proving too much,” but his contention that section 501(c)(3) leads ineluctably to the widespread suppression of constitutional rights is subject to the same criticism.

Hamburger, alas, comes up short.

Liberal Suppression imputes to the American populace during the 19th and 20th centuries all manner of “anxieties,” “fears,” and “prejudices.” Hamburger contends that section 501(c)(3)’s broad restrictions on political speech were motivated by “fervid and often nativist anxieties about religion and politics,” but the existence of anti-Catholic sentiment in certain pockets of America doesn’t explain the adoption of even-handed restrictions on all ecclesiastical speech—and, for that matter, on all tax-exempt organizations. History is complicated. “Anxieties” over many different subjects have abounded since the Founding. The 20th century in particular presented many things for Americans reasonably to be “anxious” about.  No matter how fervent the effort, not all dots can be persuasively connected.

Nor does Hamburger explain convincingly why “idealistic organizations” such as churches, schools, and charities should have the right to operate on a tax-exempt basis and engage in unrestricted expression, even purely political advocacy. Section 501(c)(3) doesn’t limit the speech or activities of all organizations, only those that have chosen to organize as a tax-exempt entity. Reprising a pet theory he has articulated in previous articles, Hamburger contends that conditions (such as restrictions on certain types of political advocacy) cannot be placed on eligibility for legal privileges (such as tax exemptions) without violating the First Amendment, arguing that “private consent cannot enlarge the government’s constitutional authority.”

This absolutist position is untenable because the same objection would apply to restrictions on the political activities and speech of government employees (such as the Hatch Act), active-duty military personnel, classroom teachers, FCC licensees, and other recipients of legal privileges. If no restrictions on the speech or activities of non-profits are constitutionally permissible, as Hamburger contends, doesn’t that force taxpayers to subsidize such advocacy (and also the donors to such groups, whose contributions are tax-deductible)? Justice William Rehnquist so argued in Regan, pointing out that

Congress has merely refused to pay for the lobbying out of public moneys. This Court has never held that Congress must grant a benefit such as [the non-profit] claims here to a person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right. This aspect of these cases is controlled by Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), in which we upheld a Treasury Regulation that denied business expense deductions for lobbying activities. We held that Congress is not required by the First Amendment to subsidize lobbying.” [5]

We consent to many things beyond the government’s constitutional reach in order to receive privileges to which we have no inherent entitlement: we agree to searches (via metal detectors) to enter airports and certain public buildings, drug-testing and background checks for certain government jobs, breathalyzers-on-demand for drivers licenses, and so forth. Welfare benefits are sometimes conditioned on drug-testing and other intrusions. Hamburger’s position, if adopted, would ban all these things.

Does section 501(c)(3) “threaten the core of most First Amendment freedoms,” as Hamburger claims? Liberal Suppression, despite its undeniable erudition and interesting digressions into American political (and theological) thought and historical asides, falls short of making a compelling case. Hamburger is likewise unconvincing in his attempt to make a connection between the restrictions in section 501(c)(3) and contemporary forms of censorship such as campus speech codes. While Hamburger’s theoretical arguments seem to miss their mark, they are always engaging and sometimes contains gems like this:

American religion has increasingly been aligned with popular liberal and progressive opinion—even to the point of looking for salvation not in another world but in this one, and not so much from God as from democratic government.

[1] For ease of reference, I use the term “non-profit” as synonymous with an organization that has been granted tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3).

[2] Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).

[3] The predecessor to the IRS imposed some restrictions on political speech by regulation in 1919.

[4] Hamburger’s frequent use of the terms “liberal, “suppression,” “nativism,” and “prejudice,” which he parses in great detail, is—sometimes confusingly–considerably more nuanced than their ordinary meaning.

[5] 461 U.S. at 545-46. Hamburger criticizes the reasoning of Regan for, inter alia, treating exemptions and deductions interchangeably, but maintains that neither justifies political restrictions in any event. Hamburger suggests that Rehnquist and his colleagues were—at least “unselfconsciously”—blinded by theologically liberal prejudice.

Reader Discussion

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on September 27, 2018 at 09:20:11 am

Mark:

OK, BUT:

"Under Section 13A of the Income Tax Act, political parties are exempt from paying Income Tax but are required to file their Income Tax returns annually to the Income Tax Department. They enjoy 100% tax exemption from all sources of income."

So the question is:

Why should ONE organizations' political speech be exempt from taxation?

How do we square this?

BTW: I would prefer that ALL tax exempt organizations refrain from political lobbying or give up their tax exempt status.

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gabe
on September 27, 2018 at 10:11:04 am

Tax exemptions are not a subsidy. Surprised to see Pulliam buying into this nonsense. An exemption for some may be unfair vis-a-vis other similarly situated taxpayers, but to call it a subsidy is category error. The fact that when rendered as scalars tax subsidies are mathematically indistinguishable from subsidies does not magically make them identical. Sheesh. Yes I see that Pulliam sort of agrees that the concept of "tax expenditure" is nonsense, but that is synonymous with subsidy which Pulliam unequivocally identifies with a tax exemption. Assuming Pulliam's objection to "tax expenditure" is sincere, he should follow his own reasoning even where it does not support his intuitive objections to Hamburger's claims.

I haven't read Hamburger's new book yet, but to me the issue is not a matter of pure classifications as Pulliam's critique seems to suggest but rather the unavoidable fact that real human beings must, and are empowered with the authority of the State to, decide on this question case by case. The federal bureaucracy being of necessity an apparatus of progressive Left statism, it is obviously probable that such decisionmaking authority, especially in times of political turmoil like the last X years (5? 10? 20? do I hear 30?) in this country will weigh against conservative and libertarian viewpoints and toward progressive Left viewpoints.

gabe suggests all tax exempt organizations be prohibited from political "lobbying" but in an era where every single aspect and event is politicized by the progressive Left, how is this even possible?

The fundamental problem is our tax code, not this superstructure of political versus nonpolitical speech.

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QET
on September 27, 2018 at 12:03:37 pm

I have occasionally opined that Bob Jones University v. US was wrongly decided, in that it withheld a government benefit (tax exemption) based on Bob Jones U’s religious practices. So I’m interested in this topic. But … wow, this was not what I was expecting.

Hamburger’s frequent use of the terms “liberal” … is—sometimes confusingly–considerably more nuanced than their ordinary meaning.

No kidding.

Traditionally Catholics were an oppressed minority, often recent immigrants. It’s far from clear why opposition to THAT Catholicism would have been regarded as “liberal.” Yes, it might have been promoted by Democrats, but Democrat does not equal liberal—especially in 1934.

Movements to suppress religious practices associated with immigrants are still with us. Would Hamberger also characterize those movements as “liberal”?

Hamburger argues [] that “if refraining from taxing amounted to spending, then all Americans would always be recipients of government largess.” Under this logic, Hamburger avers, the government’s decision to forgo a higher tax rate “could extend section 501(c)(3)’s restrictions to all Americans.” Hamburger properly objects to the concept that “the government is spending wherever it does not impose a higher tax rate.” Such an open-ended application of “tax expenditure theory” could justify sweeping restrictions on speech.

Did Hamburger opine on Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International, Inc., wherein SCOTUS ruled that government grants cannot be made conditional on abridging someone’s freedom of speech?

Pulliam rejects Hamburger’s argument on legal grounds. But I dunno; doesn’t seem crazy as a matter of doctrine. Rather, it seems crazy as a matter of politics. Tax levels are limited by POLITICAL considerations, not doctrinal ones.

Imagine Hamburger’s scenario occurred: Congress raised tax levels, but offered an exemption for people who agreed not to engage in political speech. Plenty of people would grudgingly take the deal, and thereafter make all of their political speech covert. (Anonymous political speech is already pretty common on the internet.) Others would refuse as a matter of principle and publicly denounce the Congressmen who voted for the policy. Still others, too poor to pay income taxes, would join in the protests (perhaps covertly subsidized by others). The policy would be tied up in court for a while, and somewhere we’d find a federal judge (or two, or 94) to order an injunction. Within two years voters would replace the Congressmen who voted for the policy, and the new Congress would regard repealer as Job 1. A suicidal Senate might hold out for another two years before most of its members got ejected, too—along with any president foolish enough to have signed the law. Then the new officials would vote refunds for anyone who got caught in the trap. Problem solved.

We need the Constitution to protect us from problems that lack a democratic remedy. It’s not clear that Hamburger’s hypothetical is one of those. His parade of horribles is short, wildly implausible, and not all that horrible.

Hamburger contends that conditions (such as restrictions on certain types of political advocacy) cannot be placed on eligibility for legal privileges (such as tax exemptions) without violating the First Amendment, arguing that “private consent cannot enlarge the government’s constitutional authority.”
This absolutist position is untenable….

Again, no kidding.

The new owner of a paperclip factory refused to be complicit in war, and thus refuses to fulfill the Pentagon’s paperclip order. The Pentagon gets a new supplier, but then sues for return of its advanced payment for paperclips. Would Hamburger argue that “idealistic” organizations get to speak and act in accordance with their beliefs, and it was wrongful for government to impose conditions on these organizations, even in exchange for receiving benefits that would not otherwise be available?

Hamburger simultaneously argues that section 501(c)(3) constitutes an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
* * *
[T]he assumption underlying much of the scholarship supporting section 501(c)(3) [is] that the section’s exemptions are merely “subsidies” or “tax expenditures”…. [T]he Sixteenth Amendment authorizes the taxation of all corporate entities—even churches, schools, and charities….

Exactly. And section 501(c)(3) targets these subsidies to, among other things, RELIGIOUS organizations. This is government funding of religion, pure and simple. If Congress were to repeal section 501(c)(3) and simply vote to issue checks out of the public Treasury to these organizations, the economic effect would be identical, but does anyone doubt that courts would declare the practice unconstitutional on its face?

Moreover, section 170(c)’s policy of granting tax exceptions for donations to charitable organizations arguably falls afoul of Equal Protection. You and I might each give $100 to the same organization—but the reward we receive for doing so depends upon our tax bracket, with richer people receiving larger rewards than poor people for engaging in identical behavior.

And then we have the more obvious problems of Equal Protection: My donation to an organization to put up a Pro Choice billboard does not give me a tax advantage, while your choice to give money to the Catholic Church to put up a Pro Life billboard does. My membership to Gold’s Gym is higher than your membership to the YMCA, simply because the Y claims a religious tax exemption that Gold’s cannot. Etc.

Recall how Republicans raved about alleged improprieties at the Cincinnati IRS regarding the biased manner in which tax exempt status was being doled out? I can think of a clean, easily-implemented, impossible-to-manipulate way to eliminate that problem from ever occurring again: Ditch 501(c)(3). If Congress wants to subsidize something (and is constitutionally able to do so), let them do so forthrightly rather than covertly, and then defend their choices to the electorate. And if I want to subsidize something, let me do so with my own, after-tax dollars.

And while we’re at it, let’s talk about the mortgage interest deduction….

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nobody.really
on September 27, 2018 at 12:36:15 pm

Moreover, section 170(c)’s policy of granting tax exceptions for donations to charitable organizations arguably falls afoul of Equal Protection. You and I might each give $100 to the same organization—but the reward we receive for doing so depends upon our tax bracket, with richer people receiving larger rewards than poor people for engaging in identical behavior

This is not correct. The rationale for graduated tax brackets is marginal utility. X makes $20,000/yr and Y makes $200,000. Tax them both at 10%. X pays $2,000 and Y pays $20,000, 10x what X pays. But this is not fair because, according to the rationale, the marginal utility of that $2,000 to X is much more than that of the $20,000 to Y. So X is in fact paying more than Y on a fairness basis. Same with progressive brackets, only more so. Taxing X's incremental additional $5,000 in income at 15%, but taxing Y's incremental $5,000 in income at $25%, is more fair than taxing both at the same rate, so the theory goes, because the marginal utility to Y of the net $3,750, given his total income, is the same as the marginal utility to X of the net $4,250 given his total income.

But you can't refuse the logic when applied in the other direction. Cut the tax rate on that marginal $5,000 in income to 10% for Y and 5% for X, and you can't argue that the $750 tax savings to Y is a greater reward than the $500 tax savings to X, because by the logic of marginal utility, X's $500 = Y's $750.

Apologies for the pedantic presentation.

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QET
on September 27, 2018 at 14:15:46 pm

Apologies for the pedantic presentation.

Not at all; I love this stuff. But I’m not following this argument.

Cut the tax rate on that marginal $5,000 in income to 10% for Y and 5% for X, and you can’t argue that the $750 tax savings to Y is a greater reward than the $500 tax savings to X….

Whatever the merits of this argument, I don’t think this is equivalent to the idea of a charitable tax deduction.

Hypothesis: We offer tax deductions in order to encourage charitable donations. So the magnitude of the deduction should be some function of (among other things) the incentive required to get the donation. How hard is it to extract a $100 donation from a rich person—that is, to induce the person to forgo $100 in consumption—and how hard to extract the same donation from a poor person? If you believe that people generally experience diminishing marginal returns on consumption—that is, a $100 donation might cause a rich person to forgo a fancy mean, and cause a poor person to forgo buying medicines—then it follows that we’d want to offer a GREATER incentive to the poor person than the rich one. But our tax code does the opposite.

Of course, marginal returns on consumption is just one variable. Perhaps poor people anticipate greater returns on donations. After all, many charities serve the poor. And if diseases contribute to poverty, we might expect to find poor people especially prone to donate money to treat/cure diseases as a means of helping themselves. Conversely, rich people might derive more status advantages from having a reputation of being charitable, whereas poor people might incur DISadvantages from having such a reputation. Much of this is speculation, so I largely discount this kind of analysis.

(At about minute 39 of this video, you can see a rich person succeeding in getting a poor person to make a charitable donation. It wasn’t easy.)

That said, perhaps QET is alluding to the challenge of Ramsey-based pricing.

Generally Ramsey argued that, in seeking to allocate benefits and burdens, it makes sense to allocate more burdens (and fewer benefits) to people who have fewer means to evade the burdens (“lower elasticity”). In practice, this often means burdening the poor more than the rich, and benefiting the rich more than the poor.

Thus, if you want troops to volunteer for your army, it makes sense to praise the nobles/slaveowners for their bravery in joining more than you praise the serfs/slaves who also join. After all, the rich people had more and better options they had to forsake, whereas the poor people have fewer and crappier options. Similarly, it makes sense to tax labor more than capital because capital can more easily move across borders to evade a tax, whereas labor often has a harder time changing jurisdictions.

In the case of charitable contributions, however, the alternative to making a donation is equally available to rich and poor alike: Don’t make a donation. So I don’t think that Ramsey pricing considerations apply here.

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nobody.really
on September 27, 2018 at 14:21:40 pm

Ha! nobody, it appears as if QET "gotcha" on the unfairness of charitable deductions. Poor Dear!!!!!

I notice that in your comments, nowhere was to be found a critique of the tax exemptions for political parties. Why is that?
And as you say, the IRS and other agencies are filled with "fallible" human beings who may or may not make "wise" decisions some of which may adversely affect religious organizations and some may benefit these organizations.
So What! Only to those who refuse to recognize or accept the *political* nature of such decisions is this a problem.

Yet you do point to the implications for politicians making a "bad" decision. Why be upset over Tax exemption for Churches but not upset over tax exemptions for political parties.

What is the common thread that permits of these two seemingly contradictory stances?

Oh, I get it, The Parties present us with something factual, something that is not "mythical" or superstitious. -Yeah, right. Listened to any Democrat talking points lately? or any of the Libertarian encomiums to the Glorious Regime of Free Trade that could be upon us if only we would embrace it and open immigration.
Talk about myths and superstitions.

Now here is a proposal that you may like:

Forbid lobbying (yikes, some would define that as political speech) by any company that applies ANY section of the US Tax Code that provides for exemptions, lower rates, deductions, etc etc. Go all in - not just Churches and other 501(c)3 organizations.

Is that what you want? - a substantial infringement of speech?
Simpler, I assert to simply eliminate the exemptions and the possibility for the corrupted modern version of * Cincinnat[-ians]us to take license with the codes and regulations and apply them against one type of 501(c)3 organization.

BTW: That was a crummy excuse for the Cincinnati IRS scandal, which incidentally WAS NOT limited to, nor launched by Cincinnati but rather at Obama headquarters in the IRS building.

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gabe
on September 28, 2018 at 07:58:30 am

These problems would not exist if we replaced income taxation with duties and excises (a la pre-1913):

https://deanclancy.com/clancy-renewal-plan-plank-4/

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Dean Clancy
on September 30, 2018 at 09:32:15 am

“Under Section 13A of the Income Tax Act, political parties are exempt from paying Income Tax but are required to file their Income Tax returns annually to the Income Tax Department. They enjoy 100% tax exemption from all sources of income.”

So the question is:

Why should ONE organizations’ political speech be exempt from taxation?

How do we square this?

The US compiles its federal tax statutes at United States Code Chapter 26 (titled "Internal Revenue Code"). There is no 26 U.S.C. § 13A.

The language you quote offers a critique of the tax code of INDIA. How the HELL did you end up on that web page? From your comments, I understand that you digest a remarkable range of dubious news sources; which one directed you to THAT web site?

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nobody.really
on September 30, 2018 at 17:59:44 pm

Oh, if someone does not agree with YOU then there sources are dubious. In this case, I got it from your favorite site - Wikipedia link.
So my bad, as my quesry specifically listed US political parties.

BUT MY POINT WAS CORRECT, anyway nobody and I suspect that you know that.
Here is an opinion from a certified public accountant:

"For a political oranization’s “tax exempt purpose,” they are not subject to US income tax. The IRS defines the exempt function as “influencing or attempting to influence an election for public office.” Exempt Function - Political Organization Accordingly, certain types of income would be exempt: 1. Contributions of money and/or property, 2. Membership dues and fees, 3. Proceeds from a political fundraising or entertainment event or sale of campaign materials, 4. Proceeds from bingo games (an aside, someone in Congress LOVES Bingo because it’s tax exempt often.) Exempt Function Income of Political Organizations"

And for you Mr Know it all, there is this straight from the IRS:

"The exempt function income of a political organization is income that the organization sets aside for use for its exempt function that was received as one of the following four types of income:

A contribution of money or other property;
Membership dues, fees, or assessments from a member of the political organization;
Proceeds from a political fundraising or entertainment event or from the sale of political campaign materials, which are not received in the ordinary course of any trade or business; or
Proceeds from conducting bingo games that are defined in Code section 513(f)(2)."

and here is the link to the IRS:

https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/political-organizations/exempt-function-income-of-political-organizations-1

So yeah, my bad. I picked the wrong link BUT ended up being correct anyawy.
So I ask again, Why is one organization allowed to engage in political activities while another is not.

I know why says nobody:

so we can keep those filthy Christians and Jews from influencing the voters with their atavistic superstitions.

Have fun and please Dear Boy, don't keep your nose raised at such a steep angle - it is bad for blood flow to the cranium.

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gabe
on October 02, 2018 at 08:52:13 am

[…] important at least to come to grips with the realities that underlie the book’s conclusions, and Pulliam’s review fails to do this. To evaluate the prejudice, one must understand its nature; and to judge the constitutional […]

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Image of Section 501(c)(3)’s Legacy of Prejudice: Mark Pulliam Sees No Evil
Section 501(c)(3)’s Legacy of Prejudice: Mark Pulliam Sees No Evil

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