It has been four years since Sir Roger Scruton passed away, leaving a significant gap within the sphere of intellectual conservatism. The void is evident due to the undeniable impact that Scruton had, earning him the title of one of the best-known British conservative philosophers at the onset of the new century. This recognition stems not only from the importance of his ideas but also from his role as a pivotal figure in popularising conservatism within political, academic, and social discourse. He achieved this through his academic and popular writing, an active public intellectual life, his editorship of the Salisbury Review, and his activism in Central Europe, which garnered him animosity from all the right quarters.

Despite Scruton’s near-universal adulation within conservative circles across the West, certain quarters of Britain’s conservative tradition identified some issues with his interpretation of conservatism. For instance, Scruton recounted that Maurice Cowling considered the project to construct a philosophy of conservatism as naive, since the doctrine is rooted in history and practical considerations. Furthermore, Cowling, focusing on Scruton’s editorship of the Salisbury Review argued that it represented “the nearest intellectually reputable thing that England has had to the authoritarian Conservatism which de Maistre, in a Christian, and Maurras in a post-Christian, mode had propagated in France.” Cowling’s words imply that Scrutonian conservatism has more in common with continental conservatism than with the British tradition. Consequently, Cowling’s reservation about Scruton’s take on conservatism points to the difference between what the former labelled as the Peterhouse and Scrutonian Right.

Cowling’s reservations were also echoed by what he labelled the LSE Right, particularly by one of its most active members, Kenneth Minogue. Minogue and Scruton were acquainted through their participation in Shirley Letwin’s salon, meetings of the Conservative Philosophy Group, and, in the words of Scruton, “the many occasions when we would find ourselves signed up to this or that initiative, institution, or campaign that we both believed in.” Despite their involvement in intellectual groups and conservative political campaigns, they rarely engaged with each other intellectually about conservatism in the public sphere. However, in reviewing George Watson’s book, The Idea of Liberalism, Minogue made a passing critique of Scruton. Minogue wrote that Scruton’s conservatism “suggests the radicalism of the 1960s” and shares with the revolutionary a “dogmatic conviction that there is only one right path in politics,” which is significantly divergent from “anything that might be called conservative in Oakeshott.”

Minogue’s words offer an initial insight into his reservations regarding Scrutonian conservatism. First, by discerning between Oakeshott and Scruton, Minogue elucidates the distinctive character of the LSE Right’s conservatism. Furthermore, considering Oakeshott’s status as a prominent British conservative thinker, Minogue’s disassociation of Scruton from Oakeshott suggests that Scrutonian conservatism lies outside the British tradition. Lastly, Minogue contends that Scrutonian conservatism, by implying radicalism and prescribing a singular correct approach in politics, inherently exhibits ideological tendencies.

Minogue’s latter critique holds significant importance, particularly in contrast to the views of conservative thinkers such as Russell Kirk, who have consistently emphasised that conservatism is not an ideology. However, Minogue assigns a specific meaning to ideology, defining it as “a comprehensive diagnosis of the fundamental evil of the modern world, which further explains how that evil is to be cured.” As I have previously discussed, Minogue identifies two primary functions of ideology. First, it involves falsification, whereby societies are critiqued and portrayed as inherently flawed. Through this process of criticism, the second function of ideology emerges: revelation. This revelation consists of two aspects—the recognition that individuals exist within an oppressive system and the provision of knowledge on how to liberate individuals from this situation.

According to Minogue, the problem with ideology lies in two main aspects. First, it identifies the oppressive system as the modern West with its individualistic tendencies. Second, ideologies are considered by their devotees to be apolitical because they falsely claim to possess a revealed truth that places them outside the realm of political discourse. Disagreement and conflict are inevitable in political discourse, yet ideologues consider them dangerous to the harmonious society comprised of emancipated individuals. Consequently, in the ideological utopia, politics would be abolished as it is deemed counterproductive to the achievement of this new world, rendering it unnecessary.

This diversion into Minogue’s concept of ideology is crucial as it serves as a foundation for understanding his pointed critique of Scruton. This critique is evident in Minogue’s personal papers housed at the Institute of Intellectual History at St Andrews, where Minogue writes about Scruton’s conservatism:

Dr. Scruton, far from respecting the logic of party, has presented an account of conservatism as if it were the only sound social philosophy. His “Dogma” is very intellectually upmarket, and can find no place for any other view except as an error, and usually as a pernicious error. He has turned conservatism into an ideology.

The essence of Minogue’s critique lies in his assertion that Scruton has forsaken the principle of the logic of party, which posits that each political doctrine holds equal value in the realm of political discourse. Scruton, according to Minogue, portrays conservatism as the superior or valid doctrine, thus deviating from this principle. Minogue’s argument is grounded in Scruton’s identification of errors within socialism and liberalism. To be fair to Scruton, he acknowledges some truth in both doctrines—socialism in the concept of mutual dependence and social membership, and liberalism in the promotion of individual liberty free from arbitrary power. However, Minogue contends that Scruton, akin to an ideologue, presents conservatism as possessing a deeper and revealed truth, which serves as a corrective doctrine to the perceived errors of socialism and liberalism.

Minogue’s central concern is that this purported deeper truth is intended to guide conservative politics, which raises some problems. Firstly, it contradicts the very essence of conservatism by formalising it into a set of rigid principles. Secondly, by asserting the superiority of conservatism, it places it beyond the realm of political discourse, as Minogue puts it, leading to “the annihilation of all other legitimate possibilities … and hence the abolition of modern politics altogether.”

Scruton did not intend to present conservatism in such a sense, but an analysis of the interconnected claims he makes about conservatism still supports the ideological charge. First, Scruton contends that modernity has alienated the individual “I” from the collective “We.” In response, he proposes the construction of a new political order based on a pre-political unity of the collective “We.” Furthermore, Scruton suggests that this pre-political unity is inherently tied to a natural order, which conservatives have privileged access to.

The problem arises with the concept of alienation, which Scruton adopts in a non-Marxist form. Firstly, for Scruton, the primary concern facing political conservatives is the alienation engendered by “Oikophobia”—the disdain, rejection, or repudiation of one’s home—within modernity. In contrast, Minogue argues that Scruton exaggerates the fragmented nature of individuals in the contemporary world. Second, and more significantly, the condition of alienation and the requisite pre-political unity needed to alleviate individuals’ plight necessitates revelatory knowledge accessible only to genuine conservatives.

According to Minogue, in order to access this revelatory truth, Scruton has adopted the two functions of ideology. First, falsification is evident in Scruton’s critique of liberal ideals and institutions as fundamentally flawed, such as their conception of the individual and the basis of political legitimacy. This led Minogue to remark that Scruton harbours “a settled hostility to liberalism and even, at times, to liberty itself.” Through this process, Scruton attains revelatory knowledge about the alienated condition of individuals and the means to redeem them by accessing the pre-political form of unity that serves as the foundation for political action. Consequently, in the Scrutonian worldview, politics is dichotomised into those confined in Plato’s cave and those who have escaped to the light.

In asserting a revealed truth, Scruton has effectively transformed conservatism into an ideology. This transformation brings forth the second charge that Minogue levies against Scruton, which is that his account of conservatism falls outside the tradition found in Britain. Minogue writes,

What Dr. Scruton [conservatism] has done is to fossilize an important aspect of Conservatism and the British tradition (namely, its respect for existing communities and arrangements) into the dream of a regulated utopia (cohesive families and aesthetic regulations) which is not only impossible but, in many respects, untrue to the Anglo-Saxon Tradition.

Their disagreement lies in their respective interpretations of the British way of life. Scruton focuses on nurturing communal bonds through the practices and institutions of Britain, emphasising their role in sustaining societal cohesion. While Minogue acknowledges the value of these communal bonds as conditions of freedom, he contends that Scruton has dispatched with the belief that individualism is at the heart of Britain’s condition of freedom. According to Minogue, individualism, as a moral practice inherent in Britain, allows individuals to pursue their felicity and moral identity within an orderly civil association. This individualistic ethos not only underpins Britain’s condition of freedom but also fosters its people’s vitality, richness, spirit, entrepreneurship, and other dimensions of societal flourishing.

Scruton further distances himself from the British tradition through the ideological nature of his conservatism. Conservative thinkers like Nöel O’Sullivan and Anthony Quinton have argued that the core of British conservatism is the recognition of the imperfection of human conduct, which necessitates a restrained style of politics. Minogue argues that Scruton departs from this tradition by imposing undue expectations on politics. Scruton’s heightened demands on politics stem from his identification of the primary challenge facing political conservatives in modern times and his proposed solution. As mentioned earlier, Scruton regards the central concern for political conservatives as the alienation of the “I” from the “We.” Consequently, political conservatives feel compelled to embark on a salvational endeavour aimed at liberating the individual from this predicament. This can be achieved through an expansive view of legitimate political action, which involves the coercive power of the state guided by the revealed truth that Scruton has discovered.

Minogue identifies asking too much from politics as one aspect of the problem, which is interconnected with another issue: Scruton’s misidentification of the primary challenge facing political conservatism. In Minogue’s view, this challenge revolves around the divorce of individualism from its essential prerequisite of authority, resulting in the proliferation of impulsive conduct. This divorce originates from the ideological assault on authoritative conditions for human conduct, beginning with the rule of law, which is perceived by ideologues as a tool of oppression. The dismantling of social institutions of authority, such as the family, has led, in Minogue’s words, to “a graveyard of inherited conventions.” Lastly, our inner authority has increasingly been supplanted by a servile mind, wherein individuals have relinquished their moral agency and autonomy. In response to this situation, Minogue suggests that political conservatives should not seek to recreate the City of God on Earth; instead, they should focus on navigating the ship steadily and keeping it afloat in the boundless ocean of modern life.

Minogue’s critique raises pertinent questions about Scrutonian conservatism. However, it is important to consider that Minogue’s criticism of Scruton may not fully encompass the breadth, context, and evolution of Scruton’s thought, especially given that Minogue’s critiques primarily stem from his reading of Scruton’s The Meaning of Conservatism (1980). Over time, it appears that Minogue’s perspective on Scruton may have softened. This is noticeable in Minogue’s review of Mark Dooley’s work on Scruton, where he expressed regret over the lack of academic attention devoted to Scruton’s contributions to conservatism, despite the criticism and hostility Scruton faced from the Left. The reason could be that Minogue began to affirm the conditions of freedom in his increasing attention to social and cultural issues as Scruton did. Alternatively, Scruton himself may have moderated certain aspects of his positions that Minogue initially found problematic. Take, for example, Scruton’s book The Uses of Pessimism and the Danger of False Hope. In this work, Scruton, much like Minogue’s, argues that human imperfection makes the ideological “belief that we can advance collectively to our goals by adopting a common plan, and by working towards it, under the leadership of some central authority such as the state,” a fallacy.

Minogue would have certainly not disagreed with Scruton’s acknowledgment of the ideological fallacy. The problem that Scruton failed to understand was what Minogue noted:

The main danger besetting the conservative is that he may become so enchanted with the particular things that he finds suitable for conservation at his particular time that he will begin to construct a fixed ideology-a static blueprint of a good society.

For Minogue, Scruton’s scepticism of ideological dreams from the Left was in good order, but he failed to look inward at his own ideological inclinations. This ideological inclination raises the key question: the viability of Scrutonian-inspired conservatism as a guiding philosophy for the future of conservative politics. From Minogue’s standpoint, the answer seems to be negative. However, the broader question remains: can Minogue-inspired conservatism fill this role? Well, when comparing name recognition, fame, adulation, and attractiveness to the conservative masses of both, it appears this question has already been answered.