It took almost 80 years. That’s how long Argentina’s economy and society have been in free fall. In some ways, it’s a testament to our greatest fears about democracy and self-government that no political leader had the political incentives and simple nerve to buck the status quo. Eighty years of relentless, grinding inflation and spiraling deficits, followed by defaults, currency devaluations, and restarts before November 19. But finally, the people of Argentina have rejected a failed status quo. Javier Milei publicly won a near landslide by Argentinian standards, and when one considers the probability of Peronist cheating at approximately 100%, the margin was likely much higher. Whether or not the alternative Argentinians have chosen will “fix the situation” is for now beside the point. They have exercised the one option they have—rejecting the incumbents for the promise of something different. That’s all that democracy promises.

Javier MIlei, who today is being called “far right,” “radical,” and (by the very lazy) a “far-right libertarian,” is now the president-elect of one of the greatest failed states of our lifetimes. It’s hard to fully explain how badly governed Argentina has been by its long line of Peronist governments distinguished for their lavish spending, stunning corruption, autocratic tendencies, and economic nationalism. The economic statistics are mind-boggling. Defaults, regular annual inflation rates in excess of 100%, a resulting enormous welfare state, parasitic public sector unions, and largely complicit “centrist” politicians: all these are now the depressing landscape of the Argentine political economy.

However, if one did not live this reality but were to simply draw conclusions about the election and Milei from the international (particularly American) press, one might think Argentina had fallen into a state of collective delusion, choosing an insane, sideburn-covered Latin American version of Trump without any reason other than some vague references to inflation and debt payments. As the saying goes, the international press has buried the lede.

Milei is trying to address the disastrous situation in Argentina, but outlets such as Reuters described it as “shock therapy” in a not-so-subtle reference to Naomi Klein’s book Shock Doctrine. Klein argues that nature or war can create disasters and give opportunities for “capitalism,” (anthropomorphized through Milton Friedman) to engage in exploitation by establishing extremist policies like private property rights and markets. In this case, however, it’s the legacy of the exact policies that Klein and her ilk support that has created the unmitigated disaster. Money printing, a bloated welfare state, an emphasis on economic “independence” and other prominent leftwing economic prescriptions have made this disaster, but the irony is lost on the folks at Reuters.

Milei’s main, nay fundamental, policy proposals are all in the context of this backdrop. His firm commitment to abolishing Argentine central banking and cutting social spending is straight out of Ludwig von Mises and Milton Friedman, and it is completely appropriate given the circumstances. The only way that an “anarcho-capitalist” could be elected was in a situation of failed governance and welfare statism so dire that he could crack the door open slightly and introduce ideas unknown by the mainstream intelligentsia, let alone the average Argentine on the street.

The language used by the international media, the gigantic “blob” of interests in the World Bank and international aid community, and the mainstream economists who oppose him is designed to delegitimize Milei. They don’t want another success story like Chile in the region. Two nations that adopt “neoliberal” policies that work mean their jobs and narratives are at risk. They are and should be terrified.

The problem is their terms are like insults thrown around in a schoolyard. They are neither coherent nor consistent. Consider the three most prominent politicians to be given the “far right” treatment by the mainstream press, El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, and now Milei. What do they have in common? Substantively the answer is very little. Bukele is engaged in a crackdown on gangs and crime that involves widespread violations of due process and civil rights, but has led to a plummeting of crime rates. Meloni is known as an anti-immigrant crusader, but she also supports the Ukraine war and like Bukele has sky-high approval ratings. Milei wants to abolish central banking, and while he’s pro-life, he’s also a bachelor who brags about his sex life and argues for open markets and trade with the United States of all places. Yet to a journalist in the legacy media, they are all part of what has become known as the “far right.” Not satisfied that describing politicians as “conservative” or “right” is enough to scare their readers, the network news, national newspapers, and news services have decided to add a qualifier to the term. The growth in the use of the term is yet another example of how intellectual honesty, philosophical consistency, and respect for liberal discourse are completely absent from our public debates.

Having European roots, the terms we use to describe the left and right evolved from the divisions during an era of democratic change and national consolidation. But because the contexts were different across Europe and elsewhere, the terms never applied neatly. In the nineteenth century, the rise of socialism, and later communism, along with debates over the place of liberalism and the nature of conservatism caused considerable shifting of the meaning of the terms. Liberals such as John Stuart Mill were often associated with some form of limits on markets, but they opposed conservatives’ entrenched views on the stability of the economic and social order. Yet Soviet communism and European fascism in the twentieth century provided the sort of superficial contrasts the terms seemed to imply, although neither one provided much of an alternative when it came to liberty and freedom. Both forms of government supported economic planning and limits on individual freedom.

Once fascism was defeated, alternatives to socialism suddenly became lumped into the right, including European liberalism. When liberals and laissez-faire advocates met at the first Mont Pelerin Meeting in Switzerland, the organizer, FA Hayek, was in search of a consensus intellectual view on what a liberal alternative might look like to the overwhelming support for planning across the spectrum. Since fascism was out, the “winners” on the left began to describe pro-market liberals as “conservatives,” particularly in the US.

But when we see the media force these politicians into a two-dimensional straightjacket, it doesn’t just present a problem of categories. It’s also about the limits of elite background and education. As David Brooks’ recent New York Times column rightly noted, the national news media are very much alike in background and education. The educational institutions that produced these figures support consensus views and expert policy creation, which accord with their own preferences. Briefly, that means government solutions to government problems. Those solutions involve hiring policy people to “fix” things. But what about when the consensus is wrong? What if the theory doesn’t fit the reality? What happens when crime runs rampant in El Salvador despite the best intentions of Western policymakers? What happens when Argentina’s central bank drives inflation to unimaginable levels at immense social cost? Unconventional answers emerge and democracy gives it energy.

When policymakers see continuing failed policies and can link those failures with political opportunities, that’s when things get interesting. Bukele, Meloni, and Milei exploited that context.

The press and policy elites cannot address who Milei is or what he’s proposing on the merits because it does not fit their world view. Hyperinflation is not caused by climate change, racism, or opposition to gender displacement. It is not a social construct or a random event, particularly when it happens continuously for almost 80 years and destroys a largely upper-middle-class society. It is the political and economic failure that results from political exploitation and central planning. The Argentine bureaucracy and the chattering classes have failed citizens for decades. We know the cause, and so does Milei. His opponents wanted to make things a little less bad, possibly for a few years until they once again made things much worse. Peronism is the abusive relationship, the addiction, the concept that no responsibility is necessary after years of irresponsibility. Milei is the medicine, and he will not be an easy pill to swallow.

The possibility of Galt’s Gulch in Argentina is basically zero. He faces nearly intractable political challenges in achieving even a small percentage of his legislative agenda. And yet if he can achieve one goal he might allow Argentina to start down a different path. Dollarizing the economy might force the state into fiscal responsibility and end the monetary insanity that currently reigns. It will be painful, but perhaps not as painful as decades more of the numbing effect of more stimulus that ultimately debases the currency.

There are no easy solutions here, which is part of the reason the media and its stale-minded intellectual influences have no solutions to offer. They are left with nothing but vague language, scare tactics, and labeling. What took 80 years to destroy will take decades, perhaps centuries to recreate. Well before he won the first round of voting back in September, Milei was asked what his model for Argentina was. He replied, Ireland. Ireland of course famously cut taxes and regulation, freeing its economy and spurring rapid economic growth. Argentina could do worse than Ireland, but anything different than its current path will be an improvement.

Any opinions expressed are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of Liberty Fund.