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The Curious Awkwardness of the Argument in Federalist 10

There’s a curious shift in the discussion of faction between the start of it in Federalist 9 (penned by Hamilton) and the completion of it in Federalist 10 (written by Madison). The awkwardness of this change leads me to wonder whether Madison drafted the argument of Federalist 10 to justify a congressional veto over state legislation, a provision he advocated but which the Constitutional Convention refused to adopt. Despite his proposal’s failure, the material on factions was too good for him not to use (according to my speculation), so he shoehorned it into Publius’s discussion even though it did not fit as neatly as it would have had his congressional veto been adopted.

Papers 9 and 10 lay out a single, extended discussion, despite being penned separately by Hamilton and Madison. The start of Federalist 9 lays out the topic for both papers, “A firm Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection.”

Note the direction of the protection here: The national government can protect states from the effects of state-level faction and insurrection.

The national obligation to the states regarding insurrection is clear enough in the text of the Constitution. Article 4, section 4 confers explicit power on the national government to “protect each [state] . . . against domestic violence” on application of the state’s legislature or executive (when the legislature cannot act).

There is no similar catch-all provision for national intervention in a single state in the case of domestic faction.

There are selective anti-faction provisions aimed at the states in the original Constitution. These pertain almost entirely to factious interstate rivalries rather than to the intrastate factions that would seem to be the topic of the thesis statement in the first line of Federalist 9. Even the contracts clause of article 1, section 10, as well as that clause’s limitations on state-level money, and the provision for uniform bankruptcy law in article 1, section 8, implicated, at the time, not only intrastate abuses, but intrastate abuses that affected the national and international reputation of the other states and the national government.

The opening line of Federalist 9 then begs the question, what power is it exactly in the proposed Constitution the national government would hold to protects states generally from abuses of intrastate faction?

Madison starts Federalist 10 with a similar appeal. “Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.” While Madison does not explicitly reference state governments in his indictment, he does so clearly, albeit implicitly, in his very first paragraph.

But while Madison begins Federalist 10 discussing how union would “break and control the violence of faction,” the essay concludes, not with a discussion of breaking and controlling faction, but how faction will not spread from one state to another: “The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular states but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other states.”

That’s true enough, but note how Madison has changed the argument. That state-level faction fails to spread from one state to another is a different argument than the claim that union will “break and control” faction. A faction rising in one state can no more transmit its policies to a politically separated state than it can to another state in which it is joined together in a federal union. Indeed, disunion answers this need as much as union does.

Perhaps Madison means something like this: By nationalizing decision-making, the proposed Constitution takes policies subject to factious state-level determination and makes them subject to national-level determination, a level less amenable to factious control. Therefore union “breaks and controls” state-level factions this way.

Trying to shore up Madison’s argument this way, however, proves too much. If national-level decision making is to be preferred overall because it better resists faction than state-level policymaking, then the implication would be that the Constitution should move all policy making for superior, national-level determination. The Constitution should then have propose a consolidated, national-level government, rather than a federated government. Indeed, earlier in Federalist 10 Madison suggests tax policy is the policy area most liable for factious decision making, yet states are left almost in complete control of tax policy (notwithstanding the limitations on state taxation of interstate trade in article 1, section 10).

The broad line of argument within Federalist 10, let alone across Federalist 9 and Federalist 10, fails to cohere as applied to the then-proposed Constitution.

The awkwardness of the given argument, however, resolves itself, however, if we take the same argument and apply it to a congressional veto on state legislation. In that case, a less-factious national legislature would selectively intervene at the state level to “break and control” factious legislation adopted by a state and applied only to the citizens of that single state. This coheres with the federal nature of the government – most legislation would remain subject to state-level determination. The national legislature would constitute only an added check on state legislative injustice. Applied in this fashion, Madison’s argument would not implicitly constitute an argument for national-level consolidation. It also links back to the thesis statement in Federalist 9, that a “firm” national government would form a barrier to “domestic faction.”

To be sure, this is mere speculation, a private theory. The only evidence is one from parsimony. But the overall arc of the argument in Federalist 10 seems to work better for Madison’s congressional veto than it does as applied to the then-proposed Constitution.

Reader Discussion

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on June 29, 2018 at 07:01:10 am

"There you go again" - Ronald Reagan

Of course, your backed-into theory must ignore such Constitutional inconveniences as the Supremacy Clause, judicial supremacy in the Supreme Court, and the Electoral College, all effective means to "break and control" intrastate faction; ask HRC about this last one, don't take my word for it...

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Paul Binotto
on June 29, 2018 at 10:04:01 am

There’s really no question but that Madison originally developed this theory in conjunction with his idea for a federal veto. The internal evidence from the Federalist is merely circumstantial, but the external evidence, from other writings and speeches by Madison in 1787, is conclusive. Madison developed four different iterations of the same argument in that year, of which Federalist No. 10 is the fourth and last.

In March and April of 1787, Madison was first developing his theory of the extended republic. He wrote his first iteration while in New York, in an essay titled, “Vices of the Political System of the United States.” The eleventh vice received by far the longest explication—it was his theory of the extended republic—and it was under this heading: “Injustice of the laws of States.” In other words, Madison’s insights about the breaking and controlling of factions were meant to solve the “Vice” of injustices of state legislation. The “Vices” did not mention the federal veto explicitly, but during those same months, March and April, he was writing letters to Jefferson, Washington, and Edmund Randolph explaining the need for such a provision in the new Constitution.

The second iteration of the argument was during the opening weeks of the Constitutional Convention, on June 6. That argument was given in reply to a speech by Roger Sherman, who had said that the purpose of a federal government were very limited in scope. Madison answered that, in addition to the ends that Sherman had named, he would add “the necessity of providing more effectually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of justice. Interferences with these were evils which had, more perhaps than any thing else, produced this Convention.” He pointedly named “the abuses of [republican liberty] practised in some of the States” as being the problem that the Convention needed to solve.

Once again, the June 6 speech does not name the federal veto explicitly as the solution, but there was nothing else the Convention had discussed by that point which could possibly have had the effect of curbing injustices in the states. I agree with Michael Zuckert, who argues that the June 6 speech does not make any sense except as a prelude to what would happen two days later: Charles Pinckney would move to expand the scope of the federal veto, and Madison would second the motion. The Virginia Plan had outlined that the veto could only be exercised when state laws encroached on federal laws (a limitation obviously imposed by the other Virginia delegates, and contrary to Madison’s original design). On June 8, Pinckney moved “that the National Legislature should have authority to negative all laws which they should judge to be improper.” Madison seconded the motion, and named the same evils to be addressed by the expanded veto as he had named in the “Vices,” when he had outlined the benefits to be derived from the extended sphere.

Most conclusive of all is the third iteration of the argument. On October 24, Madison wrote a letter to Jefferson, who was then in Paris. The ostensible reason for the letter was to apprise him of the happenings from the Constitutional Convention, which had just concluded the month before. But almost half the letter (about 40%) constitutes what Madison called his “immoderate digression.” He defended his federal veto, even though the Convention had ultimately rejected it. He was also responding to Jefferson, who in a letter dated June 20 had rejected Madison’s initial idea for a veto with these dismissive words: “Primâ facie I do not like it. It fails in an essential character, that the hole & the patch should be commensurate. But this proposes to mend a small hole by covering the whole garment.”

Madison’s most complete defense of the federal veto, and his most thorough explication of the benefits to be derived from the extended sphere of republican government, are thus both contained in the same letter, and they are both tied to the problem of unjust legislation within the states. Almost exactly one month later, Federalist No. 10 would be published. It recycles the same argument, but applies it to a new end: securing good legislation in the national councils. The awkward shift can perhaps be seen in the wording of the Federalist essays, but it is obvious when examining the external evidence. So, the idea is something far more than “mere speculation, a private theory” floated by Mr. Rogers.

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Lynn Uzzell
on June 29, 2018 at 13:03:04 pm

I greatly appreciate Prof. Rogers for sharing his concerns and independent theory.

A civic citizen, chemical engineer even, may oppose the divine aura of politicians and lawyers who pretend that their propriety precludes one person’s opinions on reading the preamble to the constitution for the USA and promoting its use rather than the lamely referencing “we, the people.” It’s merely my opinion, but the preamble offers an agreement for civic discipline more than governance. Willing people collaborate for civic integrity and elect leaders to execute developed statutory justice. Everything important to a civil USA springs from the agreement that is offered in the preamble.

The term “founders” refers to leaders of political factions who competed for power. First, during the critical years 1763’s objections to tax money leaving the colonies for England’s use until 1774’s farmer-liberation of Worcester, Massachusetts. Then from elites forming the Continental Congress to the 1784 ratification of the Treaty of Pairs, which admitted to 13 free and independent states by name: 13 names for 13 constitutions (some not written). Then from elites competing to preserve the Union to 12/13 states meeting in Philadelphia and 2/3 of delegates signing the 1787 Constitution. The Signers specified radical break from both Blackstone common law and Canterbury theism, a Chapter XI Machiavellian partnership with politicians. So-called founders continued to exert factional powers and tainted the work of the Signers by demanding a Bill of Rights---a partial return to English rule. Madison is a Signer, but in my opinion a weak citizen. I hold Madison most egregiously responsible for “freedom of religion” whereas each individual may develop integrity and would, in a civic culture, be encouraged to do so.

Rogers’ discussion of Federalist 9 and 10 is pertinent the moral factions that dominate attention in 2018 USA. Substantially due to the organizational brilliance of Saul Alinsky, the past five decades have been dominated by what I call Alinsky-Marxist organizers (AMO). The current prince is Barack Obama and OFA; https://medium.com/ofa/president-obama-there-are-no-do-overs-f54154e92415 and https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/democrats-vs-trump/obama-aligned-organizing-action-relaunches-trump-era-n719311. Only a civic people can defeat the AMO push to replace the civic order of the American republic with a chaotic social-democracy.

Since April 1, I have been developing opposition to the proposal to replace Louisiana’s unique 10-2 supermajority jury verdict to enhance the impartiality of a 12 person jury in criminal trials excepting capital punishment cases. The proposal has momentum based on AMO style sensationalism and attacks on persons with opposing opinion and expression. In my case, someone stole my identity, but copying my portrait pic from Facebook, opening an account with the name “Phil Beaver,” then answering my posts with the claim to be the real Phil Beaver. Facebook stopped the offender after my report.

But the point I want to make here is that the national faction sensationalizes the English idea of “jury unanimity” as a foundation of civic morality. At best, unanimous jury decisions is a relic of obsolete English debates. In Supreme Court cases regarding the Louisiana rule, originally 9-3, the court has said the USA requires states to provide impartiality rather than unanimity and have upheld the 9-3 rule. My model, based on 67% impartial demographic and 87% judicial agreement with jury verdicts in the nation, shows that only with 10-2 supermajority is impartiality possible. Further, with one committedly biased juror, 9-3 supermajority is required and with 2 biased jurors, 8-4 is required, again, theoretically. I do not have the data to compare Louisiana judicial agreement, but starting with a theoretical chance for impartiality, consequence should be better than the nation’s 13% injustice rate with unanimous jury verdicts.

National non-profit factions are sensationalizing Louisiana’s unique provision of jury impartiality as nonunanimous and “Jim Crow’s Last Stand.” Collegiality in the Louisiana Legislature has neglected obligations to continue to provide jury impartiality that has been repeatedly held up by the USA. Roger’s ideas seem pertinent to the legality of USA impartiality in jury-supermajority vs the emotionalism of English unanimity in utopia. Thank you.

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Phil Beaver
on June 29, 2018 at 13:27:57 pm

I appreciate Prof. Rogers for sharing his concerns and independent theory in time for my current study.

A civic citizen, chemical engineer even, may oppose the divine aura of politicians and lawyers who pretend that their propriety precludes one person’s opinions on reading the preamble to the constitution for the USA and promoting its use rather than the lamely referencing “we, the people.” It’s merely my opinion, but the preamble offers an agreement for civic discipline more than governance. Willing people collaborate for civic integrity and elect leaders to execute developed statutory justice. Everything important to a civil USA springs from the agreement that is offered in the preamble.

The term “founders” refers to leaders of political factions who competed for power. First, during the critical years 1763’s objections to tax money leaving the colonies for England’s use until 1774’s farmer-liberation of Worcester, Massachusetts. Then from elites forming the Continental Congress to the 1784 ratification of the Treaty of Pairs, which admitted to 13 free and independent states by name: 13 names for 13 constitutions (some not written). Then from elites competing to preserve the Union to 12/13 states meeting in Philadelphia and 2/3 of delegates signing the 1787 Constitution. The Signers specified radical break from both Blackstone common law and Canterbury theism, a Chapter XI Machiavellian partnership with politicians. So-called founders continued to exert factional powers and tainted the work of the Signers by demanding a Bill of Rights---a partial return to English rule. Madison is a Signer, but in my opinion a weak citizen. I hold Madison most egregiously responsible for “freedom of religion” whereas each individual may develop integrity and would, in a civic culture, be encouraged to do so.

Rogers’ discussion of Federalist 9 and 10 is pertinent the moral factions that dominate attention in 2018 USA. Substantially due to the organizational brilliance of Saul Alinsky, the past five decades have been dominated by what I call Alinsky-Marxist organizers (AMO). The current prince is Barack Obama and OFA; https://medium.com/ofa/president-obama-there-are-no-do-overs-f54154e92415 and https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/democrats-vs-trump/obama-aligned-organizing-action-relaunches-trump-era-n719311. Only a civic people can defeat the AMO push to replace the civic order of the American republic with a chaotic social-democracy.

Since April 1, I have been developing opposition to the proposal to replace Louisiana’s unique 10-2 supermajority jury verdict to enhance the impartiality of a 12 person jury in criminal trials excepting capital punishment cases. The proposal has momentum based on AMO style sensationalism and attacks on persons with opposing opinion and expression. In my case, someone stole my identity, but copying my portrait pic from Facebook, opening an account with the name “Phil Beaver,” then answering my posts with the claim to be the real Phil Beaver. Facebook stopped the offender after my report.

But the point I want to make here is that the national faction sensationalizes the English idea of “jury unanimity” as a foundation of civic morality. At best, unanimous jury decisions is a relic of obsolete English debates. In Supreme Court cases regarding the Louisiana rule, originally 9-3, the court has said the USA requires states to provide impartiality rather than unanimity and have upheld the 9-3 rule. My model, based on 67% impartial demographic and 87% judicial agreement with jury verdicts in the nation, shows that only with 10-2 supermajority is impartiality possible. Further, with one committedly biased juror, 9-3 supermajority is required and with 2 biased jurors, 8-4 is required, again, theoretically. I do not have the data to compare Louisiana judicial agreement, but starting with a theoretical chance for impartiality, consequence should be better than the nation’s 13% injustice rate with unanimous jury verdicts.

National non-profit factions are sensationalizing Louisiana’s unique provision of jury impartiality as nonunanimous and “Jim Crow’s Last Stand.” Collegiality in the Louisiana Legislature has neglected obligations to continue to provide jury impartiality that has been repeatedly held up by the USA. Roger’s ideas seem pertinent to the legality of USA impartiality in jury-supermajority vs the emotionalism of English unanimity in utopia. Thank you.

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Phil Beaver
on June 29, 2018 at 14:33:53 pm

Rogers’ discussion applies to the moral factions that dominate attention in 2018 USA.

Since April 1, I have been developing opposition to the proposal to replace Louisiana’s unique 10-2 supermajority jury verdict with a 12-0 requirement. The supermajority enhances the impartiality of a 12 person jury in criminal trials.

The 12-0 proposal has momentum based on AMO style sensationalism and attacks on persons who express opposing opinion. In my case, someone stole my identity, by copying my portrait from Facebook, opening an account with the name “Phil Beaver,” then answering my posts with the claim to be the real Phil Beaver. Facebook stopped the offender after my report.

But the point I want to make here is that the national faction sensationalizes the English idea of “jury unanimity” as a foundation of civic morality. At best, unanimous jury decisions is a relic of obsolete English debates that now turn toward supermajority. In Supreme Court cases regarding the Louisiana rule, originally 9-3, the court has said the USA requires states to provide impartiality rather than unanimity. Supermajority is impartial to both conviction and acquittal. The USA upheld the 9-3 rule.

My mathematical model for impartiality with a 12-person jury, based on 67% impartial demographic and 87% judicial agreement with jury verdicts in the nation (48 states have unanimity and 13% failure), shows that, with at least 10-2 supermajority, impartiality is possible. Further, with one juror committed to bias, 9-3 supermajority is required and with 2 biased jurors, 8-4 is required---again, theoretically.

I do not have the data to compare Louisiana judicial agreement, but starting with a theoretical chance for impartiality, consequence should be better than the nation’s 13% injustice rate with unanimous jury verdicts.

In an age with increasingly accurate crime forensics, civic impartiality seems divergent: bias among inhabitants is high.

National non-profit factions are sensationalizing Louisiana’s unique provision of jury impartiality as nonunanimous and “Jim Crow’s Last Stand.” The Louisiana Legislature has neglected obligations to continue to provide its jury impartiality, which the USA has been repeatedly upheld.

The USA’s civic morality and integrity has emerged in times of conflict. Roger’s ideas seem pertinent to the legality of USA impartiality in jury-supermajority vs the emotionalism of English unanimity in utopia and Jim Crow history. Thank you.

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Phil Beaver
on June 29, 2018 at 15:30:41 pm

Prof Uzzell:

Thank you for this informative historical exposition on the "federal veto"

It appears that Rogers' was doing more than merely speculating.

In any event, it would appear that Madison EVENTUALLY achieved his purpose, albeit long after his demise. The Judicial Branch has "effectuated" (to abuse Madison's term) Mr Madison's desired goal of a Federal veto via its rather broad interpretation of the protections of the 14th Amendment (and other judicial follies).

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gabe
on June 29, 2018 at 15:32:30 pm

Are you OFF YOUR MEDICATION AGAIN?

Surely there must be some pharmacists compound that may limit your 'mathematical follies"?

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gabe
on June 30, 2018 at 09:36:26 am

Super Biased Expect impartiality Impartiality
Mjty Jurors Habitl Influd Total Predicted?
12.. 0..... 8.0.. 2.4. 10.4 NO
11.. 0..... 8.0. 2.4. 10.4 NO
10.. 0..... 8.0. 2.4. 10.4 YES
9..... 1..... 7.3. 2.2. 9.6. YES
8..... 2..... 6.7. 2.0. 8.7. YES
7..... 3..... 6.0. 1.8. 7.8. YES

I hope this table of various super-majorities with a jury of 12 comes out as I see it now.
The mathematics is easy from column one to column two. For example, viewing the fourth row, with 12 jurors, one of whom is firmly biased, an impartial verdict is impossible. The other eleven jurors being typical Americans, 67% or 7.3 are habitually impartial. The 33% who by emotions or other psychology may be influenced 87% of the time toward impartiality amount to 2.2 persons, for a total impartiality of 9.6 in the jury. Thus, with the 9 impartial, super-majority, a correct verdict is possible even with one biased juror.

I would not quarrel with someone mathematical model for how to provide an impartial jury with one biased person on the panel, so I produced my own.

However, there is data to support my three key parameters: 67% habitual impartiality, 87% judicial-process influence toward impartiality among the 33%, and the existence of firmly biased people, some of whom get through the vetting process.

It unjust for states to require unanimity among a 12 man jury when, for example, there are mean people with proprietary skills at getting through the vetting process. What the US Constitution requires is impartiality and unanimity within a super-majority. With the political rancor we suffer, I prefer a 7 super-majority in a jury of 12, as my table shows.

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Phil Beaver
on June 30, 2018 at 11:17:05 am

Sorry: "someone" should have been "someone's", "It unjust" should have been "It seems unjust" and "7 super-majority" could have been followed with "to accommodate 3 firmly biased jurors."

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Phil Beaver
on June 30, 2018 at 16:10:19 pm

gee, thanks for the corrections. It makes a world of difference in an otherwise unintelligible piece.

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Guttenburgs Press and Brewery
on June 30, 2018 at 19:37:38 pm

I appreciate your patience with my errors.

The important point is that 48 states kept England's fascination with unanimous juries. Louisiana opted for impartiality, and Oregon joined.

Perhaps one person in the late 1870s took it upon himself to examine what Louisiana did to address its responsibilities per Amendment 6 of the U. S. Constitution. He covered many issues, especially impartiality. He recommended and sold to the Louisiana Legislature the 9-3 super-majority. I call it a Louisiana treasure on par with its provision regarding free expression. [It points out that the speaker may be held responsible for consequences, and is superior to the U.S. First Amendment in that regard.]

The U. S. Supreme Court defended the Louisiana rule at every opportunity, including Johnson v Louisiana (1972). Opponents have called it Jim Crow's last stand to help sensationalize a vote in November to establish a 12-0 rule. The downplay the French influences in Louisiana, which may or may not be accurate.

I hope my model work will inspire a more authoritative mathematical model and help preserve a Louisiana treasure and a national example of a state providing jury impartiality.

At the very least, the model emphasizes that jury unanimity is not expected in today's political enmity and desperation. And 13% of the time injustice is the consequence, according to national data.

I am a chemical engineer and work for civic collaboration rather than lawsuits. Professor Rogers' ideas may help me in my collaboration with my fellow citizens, including the ones who are elected officials.

Any help from this forum would be appreciated.

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Phil Beaver
on June 30, 2018 at 19:41:11 pm

Sorry: it's "They downplay."

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Phil Beaver
on June 30, 2018 at 19:48:19 pm

Mr. Beaver,

"And 13% of the time injustice is the consequence, according to national data." - does this percentage reflect false positives (FP) or false negatives (FN), (i.e. F.P. innocent person is convicted, FN guilty person gets acquitted), or are they aggregated?

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Paul Binotto
on June 30, 2018 at 22:00:04 pm

I cannot answer your question except to say it is an overall observation that contains all the variations on actual reality. Here's the study I referenced: https://www.ipr.northwestern. edu/publications/docs/workingpapers/2006/IPR-WP-06-05.pdf. It reports percentage of time the judge agrees with the jury: 87% compared with an earlier study at 85%. In other words, it is a subjective data set to start with.

I was looking for a measure of the courtroom experience I had in a civil case: awesome influence to be impartial! However, one of our panel for two hours expressed the chorus, "It's Exxon who pay! Just give him the money!" The majority vote of eleven decided unanimously against the plaintiff, who apparently showed up for work intoxicated. I read the abstract and a couple text paragraphs, realized some weaknesses, such as biased judges, and went with the 87% to compute that 61% of the time subjective citizens may be moved from the 33% to join the 67% habitually impartial people.

Another failure of my model is that fact that the 87% includes juries that had firmly biased members. In other words, my model is too simplified for the non-zero firmly biased entries in the table. I am sincere when I say I hope my work leads to the work of a qualified modeler. Perhaps a study that reports the frequency of firmly biased jurors would be needed in order to account for their contribution to the 87% success/13% failure. Or is it 85/15?

I would appreciate anyone's model, and I imagine it would favor a 7-5 super-majority rule, because firmly biased jury candidates are the most dedicated citizens regarding "working the system." Most citizens make certain they are neither victim nor accused and could not care less about the rules until they are called on to obey them.

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Phil Beaver
on July 01, 2018 at 06:38:55 am

Interesting, good luck

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Paul Binotto
on July 01, 2018 at 11:48:27 am

Mr. Binotto, thank you for the interest and good wishes.

You enriched my presence for the next presentation of my model. I will state that the subjective 87% covers failures on both acquittals and convictions and my awareness that the 87% is tainted by uncertainty regarding firmly biased jurors.

A couple additional observations you prompted. First, accounting for the firmly biased jurors would increase the courtroom influence closer to 100%, let's say halfway, to 93%. The theoretical 12-0 jury would be accurate only 98% of the time, and with one firmly biased juror, still no theoretical chance for an impartial jury.

Second, my assumption that 67% of citizens are habitually impartial is a dream I work for; (most Americans may practice the civic agreement that is offered in the preamble to get to a civic demographic). The reality is expressed more by the 2016 presidential popular vote, 51.1% for the favorite vs the winner. (Thank goodness the USA is a republic rather than a democracy.) Using 51.1% "habitual impartiality" in my model yields no theoretical impartial jury unless the super-majority rule is at 8 or less.

My 67% assumption is based on the delegates to the Philadelphia who signed the 1787 Constitution, the delegates to the state ratification conventions, the 9/13 ratifying state requirement, the total delegate favor once all 13 original states had ratified.

Then, 99% of free inhabitants were factional American Protestants, freed from their homeland religions such as Canterbury, but only 5% could vote. Today, only 14% believe in those traditional American Protestantisms but 100% of non-felons may vote. Due to the influences of dissidents to the preamble's agreement, interest in the opportunity for civic integrity is obscure. People are crying for relief from enmity when the civic agreement for self-discipline has been available since June 21, 1788. Lincoln helped hide it by not thinking of self-discipline of by and for the people rather than governance. It's also hidden by "consent of the governed," which could be "civic integrity of by and for the people."

I appreciate your collaboration---helping me think, and if there are no objections, at an appropriate time I will acknowledge the improvements you instigated.

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Phil Beaver
on July 01, 2018 at 14:05:19 pm

Glad to know, you're welcome, and I do not object; continued best wishes in your endeavor!

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Paul Binotto
on July 01, 2018 at 14:56:10 pm
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Phil Beaver

Law & Liberty welcomes civil and lively discussion of its articles. Abusive comments will not be tolerated. We reserve the right to delete comments - or ban users - without notification or explanation.