Israel’s war with Hamas is reaching its final stages. At the moment all eyes are fixed on Rafah, Gaza’s southernmost city, but however the end game plays out, the IDF should soon have its victory. Hamas’ destruction, itself a cause for rejoicing, will have cost somewhere in the vicinity of thirty thousand lives. Now the political-theoretical rubber meets the road. 

October 7 was a terrible day, which shocked Israel and the world. The aftermath has been ugly, but far less shocking, in that the sequence of events was somewhat predictable. Israel retaliated. It was clear they would win. Over the course of the war, public opinion on both sides hardened, with growing numbers of Palestinians expressing support for Hamas, and Israelis increasingly rejecting suggestions that the two-state solution should be revived. Would we expect anything different, after five hellish months in which both sides have done terrible things to each other? Clearly, the optimism of “the handshake” has been all but completely extinguished, along with any remaining shred of trust.

Neither side now shows much interest in coming back to the table. But if the two-state solution is off the table, what else is there?

The answer is: nothing else. There is no reasonable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem that does not involve two sovereign states. Precisely because this is such a hard pill, viewed by both sides with deep suspicion, other parties will have to help bring the plan to fruition. This is not as unlikely as it initially sounds. It seems to be widely recognized now that any plausible path to peace and security will require the cooperation of multiple Arab states, which already have incentives to make peace with Israel, building alliances against the Iranian threat. Many parties would stand to benefit from such cooperation, but it probably will not be possible without a good-faith commitment on Israel’s part to work towards a two-state solution. Israelis aren’t ready to accept this yet, but they may soon find themselves low on options. If they hope to maintain security, rebuild Gaza, and prevent Hamas from re-establishing itself, they will need help. This is likely to be the price.

This isn’t really cause for mourning. The two-state solution has always been the right answer to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Jews and Arabs don’t want to live with each other, but they must somehow co-exist. This is the way.

Whatever Remains

Everyone appreciates that there are formidable obstacles to the realization of a viable, and peaceful, Palestinian state. The necessity of the two-state solution follows, not from the ease or convenience of its realization, but from a kind of moral corollary to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s principle that “Once you eliminate the impossible, whatever remains, no matter how improbable, must be the truth.” 

It would in principle be possible to “resolve” the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by forcibly expelling or massacring either Palestinians or Israeli Jews en masse. That, however, would be morally monstrous. But the Palestinians’ current political situation is also unacceptable, as it has been since 1948, under both the Arab states’ jurisdiction and Israel’s. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza need citizenship in a state that protects their fundamental rights and freedoms. A post-war settlement that makes no plan for that is neither just nor prudent.

The Gaza war itself amply illustrates that the Knesset does not regard non-Israeli Palestinians as citizens, subjects, or any class of people to whom it owes protection or representation.

Once we eliminate the clearly unacceptable options, two further possibilities remain. Israel and the Palestinian territories could be unified into a single state, in which all long-standing inhabitants are granted citizenship and full political rights. Or, two states could be established, with all long-standing inhabitants granted full citizenship in one or the other. Morally speaking both alternatives pass muster, but the first is almost unimaginable in the present climate. The two-state solution stands alone as the more attainable of the morally acceptable options. 

Once you eliminate the impossible or egregiously immoral options, whatever remains must be the plan. That’s the two-state solution.

A Foundation for Peace

If the two-state solution is so obviously correct, why hasn’t it happened yet? It’s a complex question, but we might start by noting that the Holy Land has long been cursed by a kind of excess of international interest. All major parties have vocal champions outside the region itself, which bolster their identity and ideological fervor. There are positive aspects of this, but it can deter compromise and moderation. However grim the situation on the ground, both sides are buoyed by (at least) moral and (sometimes) material support from abroad, which sustains the hope that they may not need to compromise on strongly-held priorities. 

But they do. Most importantly, both sides need to let go of some of their historically-rooted grievances and claims of entitlement will have to be surrendered. It is not possible to meet all those demands, but it plausibly is possible to give all presently living inhabitants of the region a tolerable situation, with fundamental rights and the opportunity to work for their own, and their society’s, long-term betterment. This is the appropriate goal for the present moment.

For Israel, this means first and foremost that their right to exist and defend themselves from assault must be fully recognized, especially by near neighbors. In a happier hour, philosophers and political theorists can continue their chin-scratching conversations about King David and Theodor Herzl, the Balfour Declaration, the Peel Commission, and the harrowing or heroic deeds of David Ben-Gurion. Right now it does not matter whether the creation of Israel was inspired or foolishly utopian. It exists. Its people have as much right to political protection as anyone else. After so many decades of living under the shadow of existential threat, Israelis need a pathway to real security. Of course, Americans should also understand that Israel is an important ally; it would be faithless to betray that relationship in this particularly vulnerable moment. 

The Palestinians have needs too, however. First and foremost, they need citizenship in a real state. This should not be viewed as a luxury, or a prize for good behavior; it is fundamental to the protection of human dignity. American conservatives, in my experience, often have not fully grasped the difference between Palestinian Israelis (who represent a little over 20 percent of Israel’s citizenry) and the roughly 5 million residents of the West Bank and Gaza who have lived for generations in territories claimed by other governments (Israel, Egypt, or Jordan) without being offered citizenship in any of these states.  

What I heard from Gazans was that they were fairly sure Israel would break any agreement they signed, and that the United States would back them when they did.

Gaza had an election 18 years ago, but its elected government, such as it was, will soon be vanquished by the IDF. Meanwhile, in the West Bank, Fatah has limped along for some years, exercising limited control over disconnected pockets scattered throughout the West Bank. It’s not much of a government. Their public approval rating is abysmal, partly owing to corruption, but even more because West Bank residents rightly recognize that the PA has minimal power to protect them. Since 1967, Israel has made unilateral decisions about security, trade, and land use in the Palestinian territories, largely at its own discretion. Over half a million Israeli settlers live in the West Bank, in settlements built largely for the purpose of strengthening Israel’s hold on the territory. Needless to say, West Bank residents do not vote on the Israeli authorities who make critical decisions affecting their futures and their day-to-day lives.

The Gaza war itself amply illustrates that the Knesset does not regard non-Israeli Palestinians as citizens, subjects, or any class of people to whom it owes protection or representation. Who then is responsible for them? West Bank and Gaza-dwelling Palestinians are different from many other ethnic groups who aspire to national autonomy, in that they don’t presently have a state protector with both the acknowledged duty, and a meaningful capacity, to protect their fundamental rights.

If negotiations do eventually resume, they will need to address many further practical questions, concerning water rights, air space, and the intensely emotional issue of Jerusalem. Law-abiding residents of the West Bank need more freedom of movement within their own territory. Gazans will need some resettlement options. Those issues are all potentially navigable, but only if the primary parties can get over the hardest impasse. Each must be willing to allow the other a legitimate, autonomous state.

Assessing the Options

I have acknowledged that establishing a Palestinian state will be difficult. What if it’s worse than that? If young Palestinians are indoctrinated from the cradle in the ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood, perhaps there just isn’t a plausible way to stem the violence. Granting Palestinians the dignity of citizenship will only further empower their murderous designs. 

I believe the situation is considerably less grim than that. In the short term, Islamic radicalism is indeed a serious problem, but I think those commitments might be considerably less intense if Palestinians could see a realistic path to a better life. My own perspective here is shaped by my own youthful experiences living in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza (related in more detail here). I myself believe that the two-state solution would already have been achieved if either Israelis or Palestinians had been genuinely committed to it in a sustained and unified way. Regrettably, that’s never been the case. Arguing this point persuasively would require a much deeper dive than I can currently take into the Oslo Accords, the 2000 Camp David negotiations, the 2008 negotiations, the history of the Palestinian National Authority, and the policies of President Benjamin Netanyahu. In the big picture, it is enough to say that a successful resolution would have been more attainable if more steps had been taken to build trust outside these brief moments in time, in which magical resolutions were sought from imperfect leaders with questionable bases of support.

It is deeply regrettable that Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli extremist in 1995. But undoubtedly, the Palestinians have also missed precious opportunities that they should have taken. For instance, Yasir Arafat should have at least made a counteroffer at Camp David in 2000. As it happens, I was living in Gaza at the time of those negotiations, so I discussed them with many people on the ground. Very few of the Gazans I knew seemed to want Arafat to succeed. But I didn’t hear anyone call for “throwing the Jews into the sea.” What I did hear from Gazans, repeatedly, was that they were fairly sure Israel would break any agreement they signed, with the support of the United States. I tried to persuade them that they were wrong, or at any rate that it was worth giving peace a chance. It was heavy sledding, which is heartbreaking to remember. But I could understand, given their history, why there was so little trust. 

Islamic radicalism has clearly made deeper inroads in the interim years. But people’s views and preferences can change rapidly, especially in periods of political turmoil. There are many historical examples of people who, liberated at last from a desperate political situation, shed their radical views relatively quickly. Even hardened terrorists can be surprisingly malleable under the right circumstances. 

Even if my case seems unpersuasive, it’s worth returning to the initial question. What are the real options here?

Bloodless Neoliberalism

Peace is difficult. In international relations, the theoretically obvious can sometimes in reality be impossible. My neat little two-state argument skims right over the top of ancient rivalries, deep religious convictions, zealous ideologies, tribalism, terrorism, and blood crying from the ground for vengeance. I understand this. I have personally known a sizable number of people, both Jews and Palestinians, who are deeply skeptical of the two-state solution.

I like many of these people, perhaps all the more for having serious commitments to things that go much deeper than the bloodless pieties of neoliberalism. I want people to care about blood, soil, and the will of God. But I’d prefer they do that without returning to Biblical geopolitics. There has been more than enough bloodshed in the land west of the Jordan.

I feel deep sympathies with both Jews and Palestinians. As a footloose, experience-hungry undergraduate living in Gaza, it was incredible to see the deep attachments Palestinians felt to their ancestral homeland, with some of them able to describe in remarkable topographical detail lands that they had never even seen with their own eyes. This direct encounter with “blood and soil” attachments was both sobering and humbling. How could I, who had lived in six states and three countries by age 20, begin to make sense of it?

But Israel’s history is also deeply moving. I have immense respect for Judaism, and have long taken patriotic pride in the role America has played in providing a haven where Jews were able to flourish. (It is particularly appalling, in light of this, to see that ugliest of prejudices on display even here.) It seems appropriate in many ways for the United States maintain a “special relationship” with Israel, and yet, I must also acknowledge that conversations with American Jewish friends have occasionally been a bit strained, insofar as I cannot really affirm (in the spirit of Christian Zionism) the existence of a divinely-ordained plan for modern Jews to recover the land of milk and honey. I do not disbelieve in such a thing. I’m a Catholic; how would I know what God has planned for modern-day Jews? But while I would never deign to tell either Jews or Israelis how to think about Eretz Israel, it does seem inappropriate for (say) the US State Department to factor political-theological premises into its policy. It seems to me that the wrong kind of partiality may be unhelpful even to the Israelis. The Palestinian situation has caused them unspeakable trauma, and is now jeopardizing their ability to form regional alliances that could be crucial to opposing their bitterest enemy. My own experience strongly suggests that the United States has been an ineffective negotiator in recent decades at least in part because the Palestinians, understandably, do not trust us to respect their interests and needs. We can be a better friend to the Jewish State if we can find a way to be Israel’s ally without being Israel’s lawyer.

Israelis are at present morally outraged by the suggestion that Palestinians could be “rewarded” for October 7 with their own state. Obviously, it is an emotional moment. Even recognizing the extreme barbarism of that day, it seems to me that destroying Hamas, reducing Gaza to rubble, and claiming roughly thirty thousand lives is sufficient retaliation. Still, once the hostages are recovered, and Hamas effectively destroyed, it would be ideal if the optics could be tweaked to obfuscate the causal connection between terrorism and an emerging Palestinian state. At the same time, we should bear in mind that citizenship, and the basic rights and freedoms that go with it, really aren’t the kind of thing that a person should have to earn.

There will not be a Palestinian state tomorrow, or two months from now. But it must happen. There is only one way forward Israel and Palestine, and it runs towards the two-state solution.