fbpx

Abandoning Gold and the Constitution?

Constitutional law scholars tend to focus on decisions involving abortion, same-sex marriage, desegregation, and administrative law, ignoring one of the 20th century’s most contentious legal battles: creditors’ challenge to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s abrogation of the gold standard, and contemporaneous invalidation of “gold clauses” in contractual debt obligations, in 1933.  The New Deal spawned many events of interest to constitutional historians—such as FDR’s court-packing scheme, the abandonment of the Lochner line of cases, and the Carolene Products decision—but until the publication of Sebastian Edwards’s American Default in 2018, the great debt default of 1933-1935 had unaccountably been largely overlooked. [1] In the pre-“woke” era, constitutional battles were over economics, not culture, and no aspect of the economy is more fundamental than money.  

In response to the Great Depression, one of Roosevelt’s first acts as President, after taking office in March 1933, [2] was to ban the private ownership of gold—in the form of coins, bullion, or gold certificates—and to require all private gold holdings to be sold to the federal government at a set price. This unprecedented edict was quickly followed by taking the nation off the gold standard. Then, on June 5, 1933, at FDR’s behest Congress passed Joint Resolution No. 10, unilaterally annulling all “gold clauses”—contractual provisions requiring repayment of debts in gold, used in most bonds and mortgages since the Civil War to protect lenders against devaluation of paper money—in all past and future debt contracts, public and private. As the coup de grace, in January 1934, FDR devalued the currency by fixing a new price for gold almost 70 percent higher than its century-old price.

Thus, to aid distressed farmers, debtors were allowed to repay their obligations with watered-down dollars, despite gold-denominated repayment obligations. Beleaguered rural voters favored inflation. (To remedy crippling deflation, FDR’s overarching goal was to increase domestic prices, especially for farm products.) Through these combined actions, the President and Congress had effectively wiped out more than 40 percent of all existing debt. Creditors were livid.  Bond holders who had purchased securities protected by gold clauses challenged the annulment as unconstitutional. This became one of the first skirmishes over the New Deal to be decided by the Supreme Court. In early 1935, following three days of argument, in a trio of related decisions [3] the Court upheld the federal government’s actions in a series of 5-4 decisions written by Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes, with the conservative “Four Horsemen” dissenting.

The majority blithely upheld the Joint Resolution invalidating gold clauses in private contracts, citing broad congressional power to regulate the economy and, with respect to the impairment of government obligations, denying that bond holders had been damaged by the taking. The rationale of Hughes’s opinion in the public debt cases was that annulment of the gold clause caused no economic injury to the bondholders because—even had the debt been repaid in gold coin—other features of FDR’s monetary reforms would have required that the gold be surrendered at a fixed price (less than actual market value). [4] The dissenters, who viewed FDR’s scheme as an abhorrent and dishonorable repudiation of contractual obligations, scoffed at this reasoning: “Obligations cannot be legally avoided by prohibiting the creditor from receiving the thing promised.” Justice James Clark McReynolds delivered the unitary dissent, departing from the prepared opinion to scornfully declare that the Constitution “is gone,” bitterly lamenting that “Shame and humiliation are upon us now.”

This long-forgotten showdown occurred two years before the fateful “switch in time that saved nine,” but after the evisceration of the Contract Clause in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell (in another 5-4  opinion, also penned by Hughes). [5] To some extent, the result in the closely-watched Gold Clause Cases was pre-ordained: many financial analysts had publicly predicted that a ruling against the FDR administration would plunge the country into a catastrophic crisis. According to Edwards, it was “plainly clear” that invalidating the Joint Resolution “would create chaos, including millions of bankruptcies across the country.”

American Default tells a fascinating story. Edwards, who teaches international economics at UCLA, brings a sophisticated knowledge of finance to his analysis of the chaotic conditions underlying the Great Depression, the circumstances leading up to FDR’s decision to nullify the gold clauses, and the international implications of this action. (The author casually name-drops prominent economists with whom he has rubbed elbows over the years, including Milton Friedman, Anna Schwartz, and Allan Meltzer.) His account goes behind the scenes in 1933, which he suggests is “possibly the most eventful year in American history during times of peace.”  The full cast of characters who played a role in the vaunted “First 100 Days” are often over-shadowed by FDR himself. Edwards explores the personalities of Roosevelt’s New Deal advisers, especially the economists and so-called Brains Trust.

Edwards suggests that FDR’s team was ill-equipped to manage the intricacies of monetary policy. Much of what the would-be central planners did was a haphazard experiment. Indeed, FDR did not choose his Secretary of the Treasury until shortly before he was sworn in as President. Most of FDR’s agenda during the “Hundred Days” has been panned by economists and historians. The Agricultural Adjustment Act and National Industrial Recovery Act, both struck down as unconstitutional, accomplished little. The Great Depression continued throughout the decade of the 1930s. Nevertheless, Edwards maintains that FDR’s tempestuous monetary reforms in 1933-34 arrested the nation’s economic freefall and boosted prices. Moreover, Edwards concludes—albeit with qualifying caveats—that the debt default engineered by FDR had no apparent deleterious effect on America’s economy in the long run. In both cases, Edwards offers charts and technical data (complete with “M1”) in support of his position. Friedman and Schwartz reached the opposite conclusion in their 1963 book A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960.

How well does the book, subtitled The Untold Story of FDR, the Supreme Court, and the Battle Over Gold, hold up as legal history or constitutional analysis? We have become inured to fiat currency and monetary gimmicks on the part of the Federal Reserve, but are these innovations consistent with an originalist understanding of the Constitution? What did the Framers mean when granting to Congress the power to “coin money [and] regulate the value thereof”? [6] Were FDR’s reforms within the purview of the Constitution’s “necessary and proper” clause? [7] Were the Reconstruction-era Legal Tender Cases [8] correctly decided? These questions deserve comprehensive treatment. That argument isn’t contained in Edwards’ book. In contrast to Edwards’ economic analysis, his legal narrative is somewhat superficial, derived in large part from contemporaneous accounts, some historical archives, and William Leuchtenberg’s 1995 book The FDR Years: On Roosevelt and His Legacy, which he describes as “the standard work on the Supreme Court during the time of Roosevelt.”  

Edwards acknowledges that the statutory authority for declaring a national bank holiday was “doubtful,” and notes that acting Treasury Secretary Dean Acheson resigned his post because of his concerns that the administration’s policies were illegal.  Beyond this, his largely journalistic rendition of the Supreme Court litigation is informative and may satisfy a general audience, but does not break new ground as legal scholarship. In fairness, this was not the author’s intent; yet, an account of the Gold Clause Cases is incomplete without a reckoning of the larger constitutional questions. [9]

Although FDR’s abandonment of the gold standard is a bell that even Robert Bork conceded was impossible to un-ring, the efficacy of economic policy does not necessarily determine its constitutionality.  

[1] A prominent exception is Kenneth Dam’s article, “From the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half Century of American Monetary Law,” 50 U. of Chicago Law Review 504 (1983).

[2] Presidential inaugurations were moved to January following adoption of the 20th Amendment.

[3] Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (consolidated with United States v. Bankers Trust Co.); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); and Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).

[4] Harvard Law School professor Henry Hart opined that “[f]ew more baffling pronouncements, it is fair to say, have ever issued from the United States Supreme Court.”

[5] 290 U.S. 398 (1934).

[6] Article I, section 8.

[7] Id.

[8] Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis, 79 U.S. 457 (1871) (overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1870)). See Robert G. Natelson, “Paper Money and the Original Understanding of the Coinage Clause,” 31 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 1017 (2008).

[9] Gerard N. Magliocca, “The Gold Clause Cases and Constitutional Necessity,” 64 Florida Law Review 1243 (2012).

Reader Discussion

Law & Liberty welcomes civil and lively discussion of its articles. Abusive comments will not be tolerated. We reserve the right to delete comments - or ban users - without notification or explanation.

on February 25, 2019 at 13:41:54 pm

"Edwards suggests that FDR’s team was ill-equipped to manage the intricacies of monetary policy."

Not so, sir!

after all, Secretary Morgenthau informs us that when considering a further adjustment in the price of gold, FDR instructed the Secretary to raise the price by $0.21 because "7" was a lucky number and three times "7" is 21."

Now what is NOT scientific or rational about that?

read full comment
Image of gabe
gabe
on February 25, 2019 at 15:00:56 pm

Bold holders? I wonder if perhaps that might really be "bond holders?"

read full comment
Image of N. Joseph Potts
N. Joseph Potts
on February 25, 2019 at 15:50:22 pm

Thank you.

read full comment
Image of Mark Pulliam
Mark Pulliam
on February 25, 2019 at 18:02:19 pm

[T]he efficacy of economic policy does not necessarily determine its constitutionality.

1. Consider the "unmistakability doctrine," which holds that government does not bind itself by contract unless it does so "unmistakably"--and courts have wildly different interpretations of what constitutes an unmistakable commitment. SCOTUS appears to have ruled that the unmistakably doctrine basically doesn't exist, and normal contract principles apply. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996). In contrast, the 1st Circuit recently held that "Never once has our court found that state or federal legislation clearly and unequivocally expressed a legislative intent to create private contractual rights enforceable as such against the state." See Cranston Firefighters, IAFF v. Raimondo, No. 17-1293 (1st Cir. 2018).

So, depending on your interpretation of this doctrine, arguably government may abrogate any contract it chooses, and government's choice to honor a contract is basically just a gift. People contract with government at their own risk.

2. If the Court were persuaded that striking down an unconstitutional policy would result in another Great Depression, should it do so?

read full comment
Image of nobody.really
nobody.really
on February 25, 2019 at 18:10:26 pm

FDR's arithmetic is impeccable.

read full comment
Image of N. Joseph Potts
N. Joseph Potts
on February 26, 2019 at 10:49:06 am

"“Never once has our court found that state or federal legislation clearly and unequivocally expressed a legislative intent to create private contractual rights enforceable as such against the state.” See Cranston Firefighters, IAFF v. Raimondo, No. 17-1293 (1st Cir. 2018). "

Interesting BUT misleading!

The claim was that gold clause contract holders were being denied their right of contract against another NON-State party and as such would be covered under the contract clause. And as for the gubmints ability to abrogate contracts, please consult Chief Marshall's early rulings.

As to #2, It is MANIFESTLY not the duty of the court to make such determinations, i.e., whether a Depression will result, and further, it is highly doubtful that such a determination is within the courts competence, either economically or legally.

read full comment
Image of gabe
gabe
on February 26, 2019 at 18:02:15 pm

How is forcing gold miners to accept low wages on each once of gold their effort produces different than Venezuela forcing growers of corn to accept the low wage effectively set by the government?

Raising the price of gold from $20 to $35 rewarded those willing to work mining gold to meet the global demand for gold from the US by Europe.

Gold is no different than iron, aluminum, or even corn and wheat. Its exaulted status existed only because of government dictates, and the government demand taxes be paid in gold, even when gold was extremely scarce.

read full comment
Image of Mulp
Mulp
on February 27, 2019 at 12:59:07 pm

I read about this book elsewhere but visited the library and skimmed it as a result of this post. It looks both readable and interesting. I plan to revisit and read it more thoroughly at a later date.

Let me just say that I have come to view the Austrian School explanation of the trade cycle as accurate, and most explanatory of both the boom and the subsequent bust. This was only after significant study on my own after college. So I question the economic arguments made by Milton Friedman and others in this regard.

Economic effects could relate to the legal argument, in this case, as to what the judges thought would be the outcome of their decision. As is basically the point here.

(Of course, it did not avert the Great Depression, which was pretty far along by that point.)

The reason I am posting, however, is because I only recently read (substantially, so far) a book published in 1937, that I wanted to link here:

Banking and the Business Cycle: A Study of the Great Depression in the United States
https://mises.org/library/banking-and-business-cycle-0

IMO it explains pretty well, and likely in fairly understandable terms to a non-expert, the effect of the creation of the Federal Reserve on the money supply in subsequent decades — the effect of fractional reserve banking and that this was now being done by a central bank. It also relates some interesting insight into the Fed’s own understanding of what they were doing at the time. It isn’t all about the gold standard.

I didn’t see it listed in the blbliography to this new book.

I saw it mentioned in a recent blog post, which said it was by some unknown economists. This peaked my interest. Its primary author was dean of the business school at the University of Iowa, I see from 1921-1950, and has a building named after him at the university, Phillips Hall. Also, he would have been on the faculty from 1921-1929 with Frank Knight, before Knight left for the University of Chicago (along with his student Henry Simons).

Anyway, it is writen by someone with some expertise in banking at the time. Although it is surely in part the result of an an increase of my cumulative knowledge over time, I found it a pretty clear explanation.

As I look forward to reading the book that is subject of this blog, I would similarly recommend it to others here. It is freely available in both pdf and ePub formats at that link.

read full comment
Image of dugans
dugans
on December 16, 2019 at 17:16:45 pm

Or perhaps "bag holders?"

read full comment
Image of mikesmith
mikesmith

Law & Liberty welcomes civil and lively discussion of its articles. Abusive comments will not be tolerated. We reserve the right to delete comments - or ban users - without notification or explanation.